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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Teachers' organizations are mobilizing collective strength and 
their concerted voices are becoming more articulate in their demands to 
be heard. The teachers 1 through the auspices of their organizations, 
demand an opportunity to help in the decision-making processes which 
ultimately will improve their professional economic status as well as 
conditions under which they aspire to teach. 
Teachers want a collegial voice in determining educational policies 
(Bridges, 1965). Teachers are no longer satisfied to petition the board 
of education for a chance to be heard. They now insist on a full right 
to bargain and use this bargaining power to reach settlements including 
threats of strike, sanctions, and the· employment of other techniques to 
effect a written contract encompassing their wants and demands (Shils and 
Whittier, 1968). 
Charles Cogen (1963, p. 5) contends: 
The essential merit of collective bargaining is that it 
involves teachers in such a way as to assure the acceptability 
of policies and practices which are finally adopted. Collec-
tive bargaining has created at least in elemental form, a new 
climate of freedom and professionalism in our schools. The 
spirit of freedom is the outcome of procedural innovations. 
Its components are emancipation, self-expression, and self-
determination. 
The NEA and the AFT have both renounced their pre-1961 positions 
about the use of extreme bargaining power in the negotiation of con~ 
tracts. The strike or sanction, or professional holiday, by whatever 
1 
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euphemism the organization wishes to call it, has the same result; 
i.e., a work stoppage. 
There has been a steady increase in the number of school districts 
throughout the United States which are adopting formal negotiations pro-
cedures for the solution of educational problems. 
Normally, there are two main p_rocesses of negotiating. 
One is to reduce and perhaps resolve the differences between 
the two parties to the negotiations, the other is to develop 
ways of advancing the interests which the two parties have 
in common (Horvat, 1968, p. 19). 
In support to the two processes proposed by Horvat, Walton and 
McKersie add: When two parties enter into negotiations, the interaction 
of the parties to the process shapes the outcome of the produce of their 
joint efforts. The interaction processes also facilitate the resolution 
of joint problems and the integration of the interests of the parties. 
A third result of the interaction of the parties involved in the negoti-
ations process is the maintenance or restructuring of the attitudes of 
the participants toward each other. "The attitudes of each negotiating 
party, toward the other, taken together, define the relationship between 
them 11 (Walton and McKers ie) • 
It is felt that the attitude of professionalism will influence the 
types of items brought to the negotiating table; the attitude of mili-
tancy will influence the volume of items brought before the negotiating 
bodies; and labor-management orientation will influence, through the 
presence or absence of degrees of polarization, the tone and thus the 
final outcome of the negotiations process. The attitudes expressed by 
both parties to the negotiations process are important to the possible 
outcomes of the deliberations. Negotiations involve a great deal more 
than the rational consideration of opposing views in a joint decision-
making situation. 
External factors do not necessarily predetermine the 
nature of a collective bargaining relationship. Within the 
environment created by some combination of external factors 
there is a relationship bounded by the attitudes of the 
negotiators (Deeber, Chambers, and Stagner, 1960, p. 71). 
While the importance of environmental factors on the 
outcome of negotiations cannot be denied, the particular 
approach that one or both of the parties will take to 
negotiation sessions, and the relationship-behavior pat-
terns that occur therein, are influenced by the belief 
systems of the negotiators (Horvat, 1968, p. 21). 
When two parties enter into negotiations, the processes involved 
shape the outcome of their deliberations. The processes facilitate the 
resolution of joint problems and the integration of mutual areas of 
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interest. The need is present for concern in regard to attitudes color-
ing the relationship between the two parties. 
The issues in negotiations involve important human values; 
fulfillment of the contract terms is strongly contingent upon 
attitudes; instruments in the contest involve social ideologies 
and psychological tactics as well as economic sanctions 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 184). 
These factors suggest that attitudes expressed by negotiators will 
play an important part in resolution of conflict and final agreement 
between the negotiating parties. 
The addition of empirical data relating to similarities and differ-
ences in the attitudes of militancy, professionalism, and labor-
management orientation between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators and 
similarities and differences in selected categories of contracts as 
negotiated by NEA and AFT form the basis for this study. 
The lessons learned during the last five years by teachers 
is that threatening employees with injunctions, or calling 
them disloyal or unprofessional has little if any impact on 
the prevention of strikes or withdrawals of work. 'No contract-
no work' is their ready answer to school administrators and 
boards of education (Shils and Whittier, 1968, pp. 18-19). 
Statement of the Problem 
There has been little empirical evidence to date which has focused 
upon the similarities and differences between NEA and AFT negotiations. 
The problem investigated in this study involves measures similarities 
and differences in attitudes of negotiators and similarities and differ-
ences in negotiated contracts. 
In attacking this problem, an attempt will be made to answer these 
questions: 
Are the attitudes of militancy, professionalism, and 
labor-management orientation similar between ne.gotiators 
for the National Education Association affiliates and 
negotiators for the American Federation of Teachers 
affiliates? 
Do the negotiators representing the boards of education 
which negotiate with the National Education Association 
affiliates express attitudes of militancy, professionalism, 
and labor-management orientation similar to negotiators 
representing boards of education which negotiate with the 
American Federation of Teachers affiliates? 
Are the similarities or differences in attitudes as 
expressed by negotiators representing their respective 
groups, reflected in the contracts which are negotiated? 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to: (1) Determine if there are dif-
ferences in attitudes as expressed by (a) negotiators for local union 
affiliates as opposed to negotiators for the local educational associa-
tion; (b) negotiators representing boards of education which recognize 
the local teachers union as opposed to negotiators representing boards 
of education which recognize the local teachers educational association; 
(2} Determine if there are differences in contracts which are negoti-
ated in districts recognizing affiliates of the National Education 
Association and contracts which are negotiated in districts recognizing 
affiliates of the American Federation of Teachers. 
Assumptions 
It is assumed that the scores which are reported on the Professional 
Orientation Scale, the Initiative-Compliance Scale, and The Labor 
Management Attitude Questionnaire, will represent the true attitudional 
dispositions of the subjects in relation to these scales. 
It is further assumed that the process of randomization will result 
in an accurate representation of the population. 
Definitions 
Negotiator: A teacher or consultant or administration representa-
tive who is either elected by the membership or appointed by the leader-
ship of the organization or administration, to negotiate. 
Negotiations: "A process whereby employees as a group and their 
employers make offers and counter-offers in good faith on the conditions 
6 
of their employment relationship for the purpose of reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement" (Lieberman and Moskow, 1966). 
Organization: The term organization, when used in the context of 
this study will refer to, either the National Education Association and 
its state and local affiliates or the American Federation of Teachers 
and state and local affiliates, unless otherwise specified. 
Professionalism: Corwin (1970) states the professional educator is 
one who seeks to control and monopolize his vocation. The basis for 
these efforts to control stems from the belief that educators are profes-
sional. Lieberman and Moskow (1966, p. 136) offer the following defini-
tions of a professional: 
Any employee engaged in work ••• 
(i) involving the consistent exercise of discretion 
and judgment in its performances; 
(ii) predominately intellectual and varied in character; 
(iii) of such a character that the output produced or 
the result accomplished cannot be standardized 
in relation to a given period of time; 
(iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a 
field of science or learning customarily acquired 
by a prolonged course of study in an institution 
of higher learning. 
The operational definition as used in this study will indicate a 
score on the Professional Orientation Scale. Corwin, in the development 
of the scale, indicated that the "high" professional group, used for 
validation of the scale, had published, had participated actively in a 
professional organization, and had remained in teaching at least five 
years. "High" professionalism is indicated by a score above the mean. 
The "low" professional group had not published, were not active in the 
organization, and had not been in the teaching field for a minimum of 
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five years. This group scored below the mean (Corwin, 1966). There-
fore, in this study a score above the mean on the Professional 
Orientation Scale will indicate high professionalism, while a score 
below the mean will indicate low professionalism. 
Militancy: Militancy can take a number of forms. Militancy is 
frequently evidenced through work stoppages, strikes, sanctions, mass 
resignations, and other withdrawals of services. These overt actions 
are the most visible indications of a more prevalent course of action 
taken by unions and associations. Militancy is a posture of challenge 
to the established authority in educational decision-making. 
The operational definition for militancy in this study will be the 
score on the Initiative-Compliance Scale (Corwin, 1966). This score 
will show the tendency for the subject to take the initiative or show 
compliance in hypothetical conflict situations between teachers and 
administrators. Scores above the mean will indicate a higher degree of 
militancy. 
Labor-Management Attitude: An individual's actions in interpersonal 
relations are a reflection of his beliefs. The character of the negoti-
ations process is influenced by the beliefs of the negotiators repre-
senting the teachers' organization and the negotiators representing the 
school board. 
Management's approach to collective bargaining has 
typically been characterized by an ideology that places 
emphasis on management's mission to manage. The ideology 
points to executives as the best equipped and best situ-
ated to balance the conflicting interests of the enter-
prise. Labor's approach, on the other hand, is inimical 
to the managerial position. The argument over management's 
rights and prerogatives is evidence of this ideological 
conflict (Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 196-197). 
The Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire was developed by 
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Helper (1953) to measure the attitudes and beliefs of individuals toward 
labor and management. A score below the mean on the Labor-Management 
Attitude Questionnaire will indicate an attitude favorable to manage-
ment. A score above the mean will indicate a pro-labor attitudinal 
orientation. 
Attitude: "An attitude is a readiness to act in one way rather 
than another 11 (Murphy, 1966 , p. 980) • 
An attitude as used in this paper will designate a personal orien-
tation or propensity toward an idea or value or goal held, by an indi-
vidual negotiator. 
NEA: National Education Association. 
AFT: American Federation of Teachers. 
Sample District: A school district which has recognized a local 
affiliate as the exclusive representative of the teachers' bargaining 
unit. 
Teacher Negotiators: The negotiators who represent the local 
affiliate in face-to-face negotiations. 
Board Negotiators: The negotiators who represent the board of 
education in face-to-face negotiations. 
Contract: A contract is a written agreement between an employee 
organization which represents the teachers and the employer, the board 
of education. For the purposes of this investigation, the following 
provisions form a foundation for contract analysis. 
I. Organizational Security: Provisions within the agree-
ment which protect the status of the employee organization. 
A. Exclusive Recognition: The board of education's 
acceptance of an organization as authorized to 
represent members of the negotiating unit. 
B. Rights of Exclusive Representation: The right and 
obligation of the organization representing the 
teachers to bargain collectively for all employees 
in the negotiations unit. 
C. Dues Check Off: A procedure whereby the employer 
agrees to deduct the organizational dues from the 
employee's check. The employer also agrees to 
transfer these dues to the employee organization. 
D. Negotiations Unit: A term describing the occupational 
group which the employee organization represents in 
negotiations. 
E. Availability of School Facilities: Provisions for the 
use of school facilities for employee organizational 
purposes. 
F. Elections Procedures: The procedures used to elect 
an organization to represent the employees in negoti-
ations with the employer. 
II. Exchange of Facts and Views: Provisions which insure 
III. 
the exchange of information which is pertinent to the 
negotiations process. 
Conditions of Employment: 
A. Educational considerations. Any provision set 
forth in the contract which deals with the teaching-
learning relationship, curriculum, student evaluation, 
teacher evaluation, or the fulfillment of duties as 
an educator. 
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1. textbook selection 
2. curriculum committees 
J. teaching assignment 
4. student discipline 
5. faculty meetings 
6. administrator conferences 
7. faculty evaluation 
8. sabbatical leave 
9. professional improvement 
10. student evaluation 
11. employment requirements 
B. Employee Considerations: Any physical, temporal, or 
financial conditions set forth in the contracts which 
deal with the members of the teachers negotiating 
unit as employees. 
Such considerations include: 
1. length of the school day 
2. length of the school year 
J. supervision of students 
a. during lunch time 
b. between classes 
c. in co-curricular activities 
4. room assignments 
5. seniority 
6. salary 
7. fringe benefits 
a. sick leave 
10 
b. insurance 
c. personal leave 
d. death leave 
e. tax sheltered annuity 
IV. Impass Resolution: Provisions within the agreement which 
prescribe the procedures for resolving deadlock situations 
during negotiations. 
A. Steps 
1. Formal notification of Impass 
2. Mediation 
J. Fact-finding 
B. Agency used for Final appeal 
C. Binding final step 
D. No strike provision 
E. Good faith bargaining 
V. Grievance Procedures: The formalized process for dealing 
with any complaint or expressed dissatisfaction by an 
employee in connection with the terms of his employment. 
A. Steps 
1. Submission to principal 
2. Appeal to superintendent 
3@ Appeal to board of education 
4. Arbitration 
B. Agency used for arbitration 
C. Binding arbitration 
11 
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Limitations 
The subjects in this study are geographically and occupationally 
restricted to region Five in the State of Illinois (Figure 1). Due to 
the method of selection any generalizations made beyond the present sam-
ple should be done with cautions 
Significance of the Study 
Lieberman and Moskow (1966), Shils and Whittier (1968), Hazard and 
West (1970), Muir (1968), and Carlton (1968) speak to the convergence of 
ideas, actions, and attitudes espoused by the National Education Associ-
ation (NEA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). 
Until recently, it was possible to distinguish between the actions 
of the teachers' union and the professional organization. That distinc-
tion is no longer easy to make. Since the AFT won the election for 
exclusive representation of New York City's teachers in 1961, the posi-
tion of the NEA and the AFT have been converging to a point somewhere 
between unionism and professionalism. The AFT has shown, with its More 
Effective School Program and demands for smaller classes, that they are 
not pushing "bread and butter" issues exclusively (Cole, 1969), (Muir, 
1969). The NEA, with its salary and working conditions demands, plus 
the invoking of sanctions against Utah, and Oklahoma, and a strike in 
Florida, indicates that its position has shifted to allow utilization of 
union methods which in 1961 were against the NEA policy line (Muir, 
1968). 
The significance of this study lies in the addition of empirical 
evidence regarding similarities and differences in attitudional orienta-
tions of negotiators for the NEA and the AFT. Further significance lies 
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in the comparison of contracts negotiated by NEA and AFT. Horvat, 
Campbell, and Walton and McKersie contend that divergence of attitudes 
of negotiators between negotiations teams may lead to a conflict situa-
tion or "hard-nosed bargaining". It is hoped that the data gained, 
which compares selected attitudes of negotiators and selected contrac-
tural provisions, will enable the parent organization to choose 
negotiators who will best represent the attitudinal disposition ex-
pressed by the constituency. Thus, the negotiators will tend to be more 
functionally representative of the organization during the negotiations 
process. 
Neil Chamberlain states that the process of examining the parts of 
the negotiations process; i.e., the negotiators and the contracts which 
they negotiate, will hopefully lead to the discovery of generalizations 
in relation to the structure of contract bargaining. 
The putting of pieces together so that their inter-
relationships are made clear and the bargaining structure 
as a whole begins to emerge, demands investigation•••• 
The character of the bargaining structure is responsive, in 
a broad sense, to forces that may reveal a variety of pat-
terns about which generalizations can be made (Chamberlain, 
1961, p. 19). 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Chapter II is divided into seven parts. Part one is the introduc-
tion in which negotiations in education are discussed. Part two is a 
discussion of the negotiations relationship. Part three is a discussion 
of attitudes in the negotiations relationship. Part four is a discus-
sion of militancy and a presentation of hypothesis one. Part five is a 
discussion of professionalism and a presentation of hypothesis two. 
Part six is a discussion of labor-mana919ment orientation and a presenta-
tion of hypothesis three. The final part is a discussion of contracts 
and a presentation of hypothesis four and six sub-hypotheses relating to 
hypothesis four. 
Introduction 
As face-to-face negotiations, between the representatives of the 
teachers' organization, which may be affiliated with either the American 
Federation of Teachers or the National Education Association, and the 
representatives of the board of education become more common and the 
contracts which are negotiated by these representatives become more 
comprehensive, there is doubt that the superintendent and the school 
board will continue to exert unilateral control over the decision-
making processes in the public schools. 
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Teachers within most school systems have been power-
dependent for some time on the established authority struc-
ture in education, which has been represented by the 
administrative hierarchy. In order to free themselves from 
a completely dependent position, they have moved to restore 
a balanced relationship by organizing and bypassing the 
administrative structure through the raw coercieve power of 
the strike or walkout (English, 1972, p. 193). 
It appears that the administration of the public school system is 
undergoing a change. This change indicates that the governance of the 
public schools is shifting toward bilateral decision-making with the 
teacher's organization having input to the formation of the basic 
tennents upon which the school is runo Administrators fear that as 
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teachers' organizations gain the power to veto important administrative 
actions, the administrators will be in the position of having a legal 
responsibility for the decisions which affect the school system but not 
having the authority to make the necessary decisions to run the school 
(Shils and Whittier, 1968). 
The differentiation between the American Federation of Teachers as 
a labor union and the National Education Association as a professional 
organization is disappearing. As the two competing teachers' organiza-
tions are viewed in light of local affiliates' actions at the negotia-
tions tables and at the picket lines, and as the tactical planning at 
the national headquarters of both organizations are viewed, the distinc-
tion between the NEA and the AFT seems negligible® 
Both the NEA and the AFT train organizers, employ strikes 1 
and threats of strikes, aim at contracts that are highly com-
plex and whittle away at traditional staff and board prerogatives, 
advocate firm grievance procedures ending in final and binding 
arbitration. The NEA at the local level, like the AFT, is 
driving principals, supervisors, and administrators out of the 
bargaining unit. Both organizations press hard for exclusive 
representation and the NEA is getting as tough in the infight-
ing as the AFT (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 5Ltco). 
The once wide substantive differences regarding the indus-
trial relations approach of the AFT and the professional rela-
tions approach of the NEA have now settled on procedural 
differences, such as, whether third parties in disputes should 
be the state labor conciliator or the commissioner of educa-
tion (Williams, 1968, p. 572). 
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Lieberman and Moskow (1966) state that both the AFT and the NEA are 
interested in the entire program of the school. The two organizations 
feel that the agenda for negotiations should include all topics which 
are of professional concern to the faculty of that school district; 
i.e. , "anything to do with the operation of the school." 
Professionalism in the public schools is exemplified by the faculty 
member who, as an indiviudal practitioner and as a member of an organi-
zation which represents his interests, has an interest in all decisions 
which effect the pupil clientele and the effectiveness of his work. 
This concern reaches far beyond the narrow self-interest in economic 
gains. This does not mean that a professional is not interested in self 
gain, but merely places monetary gain in its proper perspective in rela-
tion to the well-being of the clientele served. 
It is precisely at the point of making difficult deci-
sions based upon budget allocations as well as assigning 
priorities to the immediate and future needs of the total 
educational program, that the professional educator and the 
organization which represents him, offer maximum assistance 
to the boards of education (Wallett, 1968, p. 502). 
In view of the militancy engaged in by both the NEA and the AFT, 
and the tactics and results of the negotiations process as practiced by 
the local affiliates of the National Education Association and the 
American Federation of Teachers, the differences between the NEA's 
professional negotiations and the AF'T's collective bargaining appear to 
be a matter of nomenclature. 
Both the NEA and the AFT appear to be practicing a 
militant type of unionism and each organization will press 
for a contract not far apart •••• Essentially there is no 
difference in what the two organizations demand at the local 
level (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 502). 
Negotiations Relationships 
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Edward McMahon, writing for the American Management Association in 
1969, states that he feels that it is important for the parties to con-
tract negotiations to put the negotiations process in its proper per-
spective. To reach an equitable agreement in a bilateral adversary 
situation, such as contract negotiations, compromise on the part of one 
or both parties is necessary. It is necessary that both parties to the 
negotiations desire to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. A 
commitment from each party to maintain the negotiations procedures as 
the foundation from which issues may be raised and resolved is required. 
Unless the parties to the contract negotiations are willing to maintain 
this perspective, successful negotiations will be difficult or even 
impossible to maintain (McMahon, 1969). 
Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 206) delineate their criteria for a 
constructive negotiations relationship as follows: 
A constructive relationship is one based on full recog-
nition of the mixture of distributive and integrative aspects 
in negotiations. Therefore, such a relationship is one (1) 
in which the parties do not have attitudes which prevent them 
from fully exploiting the integrative possibilities but (2) 
does not make them lose sight of their primary responsibility 
to the separate interests of their respective organizations. 
Neil Chamberlain ( 195•1) states that neither party to the negotia-
tions process can secure the objectives of its parent organization with-
out a joint working relationships The terms of that joint relationship 
define the extent to which each party uses the power which they bring 
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into the negotiations process to attain its objectives. The terms of 
the collective bargaining relationship relate to matters of divergent 
interest and each party secures or makes an effort to secure its inter-
ests in relation to its bargaining power. 
Bargaining power is the ability to secure another agree-
ment on one's own terms. Bargaining power is not simply a 
reflection of personal powers, but is a reflection of all 
circumstances surrounding the negotiations teams (Chamberlain, 
1951, p. 97). 
Under distributive bargaining, coercion is the principal ingredient 
of bargaining power. The resolution of divergent interests as a basis 
for operation of the enterprise~ and nothing more, defines the negotia-
tions relationship. The bargaining relationship comes. into being be-
cause it is inescapable and neither party to the negotiations grants 
more than its lack of power forces it to grant. This is contrasted with 
integrative bargaining in which each party to negotiations defines the 
relationship as a continuing state of union-management relations which 
springs from a relationship which satisfies divergent interests suffi-
ciently to evoke a joint effort to improve performance in the endeavor 
in which the parties engage. 
Attitudes in the Negotiating Relationship 
Attitudes, as expressed by negotiators while in the negotiations 
process, provide a mechanism by which transactions at one point in time 
can be related to transactions at another point in time. It is through 
the mechanism of attitudes and the resulting relationship pattern that 
developments in negotiations are translated into contract provisions 
which define the employment relationship between the organization which 
represents the employees and the representatives of the employers 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 1~3). 
When the system of emotional control is constant, 
groups with a primary valency to fight differ from other 
groups in their ability to dig into a problem, to raise 
issues, and to settle them. Groups which strive to 
engage in integrative bargaining show the widest range of 
ideas employed in problem solution, a high level of flexi-
bility within the organization, and a high amount of 
emotional involvement and commitment to act toward solu-
tion of joint problems. 
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Shils and Whittier (1968) state that the most important element in 
a constructive negotiations relationship is a "warm, pleasant atmo,.. 
sphere at the bargaining table". If a pleasant atmosphere and attitudes 
which engender cooperation are present, the negotiations sessions will 
be an approach to bilateral solution of joint problems. 
Negotiations are a contest and like any contest put a 
strain on the participants. The 'union' and the 'company' 
are abstractions, but their representatives at the bargain-
ing table are human beings. Human beings have knowledge, 
skills, attitudes and endurance, all of which have a pro-
found influence on his actions during the negotiations 
process (Beal and Wickersham, 1968, p. 175). 
Honzik (1969) states that the personal attitudes of negotiators are 
most important. Their perceptions of the relationships between the 
employer and the employees have an influence upon their actions and 
decisions at the negotiations table. 
Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 223) supply the following summations 
of the bargaining relationship: 
Several characteristics of negotiations sessions serve 
to increase the likelihood of agreement--agreement which may 
be beneficial or harmful depending upon the skill and sensi-
tivity of each negotiator. Perhaps the most vital of such 
characteristics is that during contract negotiations, inter-
personal interaction between negotiators of the two organi-
zations is frequent and intense; hence, the increased 
salience of each party's attitudes. 
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Militancy 
Spokesmen for the National Education Association (NEA.) and the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) have charged that the decision-
making structure in public education needs to be revised. Boyan (1969) 
states that one effect of the personal, interpersonal, intraorganiza-
tional, and extraorganizational association and interaction between and 
among large numbers of teachers has resulted in a search, through extra-
school organizations, primarily NEA and AFT, for an expanded role in the 
government and governance of schools. 
Adams (1965) contends that teachers, after being systematically 
left out of the educational decision-making process, are making in-
creased demands on their employers for what they believe to be their 
rightful place in matters of policy making. 
Teachers do not want the power to be heard and then turned 
down: they have long been listened to and consulted. No matter 
how hard teachers have argued and demonstrated and reasoned, 
there has always been a point at which the principal could say, 
1 No 1 • If they then appealed to the superintendent and the 
school board, the power to affirm or reject has again· been in 
the administration. Now teachers are demanding for themselves 
the equivalent power of saying, 1 No 1 • This power intends to 
insure decision-making in consort, by working things out 
together (Shanker, 1969, p. 79). 
The NEA in a 1969 publication by the Division of Field Services 
states: 
The local association is the members' advocate. It pro-
motes his interests. It defends him. It attempts to provide 
a teaching environment that will permit him to practice his 
profession effectively. 
One of the basic functions of a local association in 
carrying out these responsibilities is to secure the right 
to negotiate with the board of education on all matters which 
effect the terms and conditions of a teacher's professional 
services (NEA, 1969, Pw 1). 
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It is well that boards of education do not deceive themselves about 
the issues being raised by teachers. They are not what they appear to 
be on the surface. The real issues are not wages, hours, and conditions 
of employment. Very few boards or administrators will deny the need for 
vast improvement in all of these areas. The bedrock issues are con-
cerned with bi-lateral policy determination between boards and teachers' 
organizations. They are concerned with the dilution of the delegated 
authority of the administrative staff. They are concerned with the 
extent to which a board can give away its ability to respond to the 
wishes of the community (Young, 1969). 
Through the utilization of organizations at the local, state, and 
national levels, today's teachers are becoming increasingly active in 
seeking participation regarding the development of the policies, rules, 
and regulations which effect their working conditions (Corwin, 1970). 
Williams, Robinson, and Walden (1970) agree in that they state that 
various groups have charged that the existing structure for decision-
making in today's public educational institutions is undergoing a 
change. One direction of change has been the tendency of some groups 
who represent teachers to force their way into the decision-making 
structure. "These groups have seized on militant action as one way to 
secure for themselves. positions of authority in the decision-making 
structure" (Williams, Robinson, and Walden, 1970, p. 28). 
Carlton (1969) states that the beginnings of the escalation of NEA 
and AFT militancy were marked by the AFT-sponsored teachers' strike in 
1961 and the subsequent representation election in 1962G 
The timid, somewhat docile, teachers' committee of the past is now 
being replaced by a knowledgeable, hungry negotiation team which is 
headed by an extremely well trained, agressive, full-time executive of 
the local federation or association (Bendines, 1969). Boyan (1969) 
concurs by stating that as members of extra-school organizations, both 
unions and professional associations, the behavior of teachers has 
changed from a position of relative docility to one of agressive 
militancy. 
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"The image of the teacher is changing from the unselfish, dedicated 
schoolmarm, to the hard-nosed negotiator or strike leader" (Lieberman, 
1971, p. 719). Corwin (1970), Boyan (1969), and Bendine (1969) state 
that the current militancy in teaching indicates that the days of senti-
mentality for the poor teacher are finished. Teachers are no longer 
content with their present level of authority and input to decision-
making in their areas of expertise. They want respect for their psoi-
tions as professional educators and want to play a larger role in 
finding the answers to educational problems. The collective militant 
action on the part of teachers through their union or association is 
representative of their search to achieve an equalization of power in 
schools and school systems. 
Teacher militancy can take a number of forms. While the term 
"militancy" is frequently used to designate overt actions such as work 
stoppages, strikes, sanctions, mass resignations, and other withdrawals 
of services, which are only the most visible indicators of a much more 
prevalent course of action taken by unions and associations, militancy 
is actually a posture of challenge to the established authority in 
educational decision-making (Corwin, 1963). 
The widespread idea that defiance is shown primarily by unions is 
not accurate. Twelve of thirty-six strikes called between 1960 and 1966 
were called by affiliates q£ the NEA (Corwin, 1970). 
Teacher organizations struck 131 times during the 1968-69 
school year. The strikes were shorter and involved fewer 
large groups than was previously the case. This is primarily 
a result of the fact that smaller suburban and rural school 
districts began to feel the effect of spreading teacher 
militancy (Corwin, 1970, p. 47). 
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11 NEA affiliates called 99 of the year's strikes, locals of the AFT 
called twenty-four and eight independent groups struck" (Phi Delta 
Kappan, 1970, p. 432). 
Teachers expect the organization, which has been designated to rep-
resent them, regardless of nomenclature used, to bring about fundamental 
changes in the relationships between teachers and their employers. 
Teachers also expect their elected representatives to press, with vigor 
and enthusiasm, in all areas of welfare and conditions of employment 
(Adams, 1965). Muir contends that teacher leaders, backed by one of two 
powerful organizations, the NEA or AFT, are: 
••• trained, financed, organized, determined, and in a 
fighting mood to win higher salaries, improved working condi-
tions, and a strong say in what boards of education think is 
their responsibility, policymaking (Muir, 1969, p. 34). 
Corwin states that both professional associations and unions are 
insisting upon the right of representatives to negotiate with, thus, 
participate with, boards of education in determining the policies of 
common concern (Corwin, 1968). Shils and Whittier (1970) contend that 
teachers have become so "restive" that it does not matter whether they 
belong to a labor union or a professional organization. In 1965, the 
7,000 delegates to NEA's Annual Convention unanimously withdrew the 
NEA's written restriction against teachers' strikes. In 1967, the NEA 
Board of Directors stated that the NEA in the future will give full sup-
port to local affiliates which go out on strike. 
The NEA and the AFT have both abandoned their earlier 
positions about the use of extreme bargaining power in the 
negotiation of contracts. Whether the technique is called 
a strike or sanction, the results are the same (Shils and 
Whittier, 1968, p. 18). 
Morris Shanker (1969, p. 79), President of the AFT affiliate in 
New York City, states: 
The conflict between the teachers• representatives and 
the administrators cannot avoid some unpleasantness~··· 
The possibility that both parties may not be able to agree 
raises the matter of the strike. I believe that there is not 
a substitute for some form of withdrawal of services, whether 
this means a strike, or resignations, or something else. 
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The NEA, while at the same time employing many of the union tactics 
which it so fervently decried, "tried to frighten teachers away from 
unionism". Yet, semantics seemed to provide the only tactical differ-
ence in bargaining power which was applied by either the NEA or the AFT 
(Shils and Whittier, 1968). 
It is rather difficult to perceive any difference between 
the NEA officers telling its members not to sign contracts in 
states where sanctions are in effect and the New York affiliate 
of the AFT instructing its members not to report to school on 
opening day (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 47). 
Corwin (1970), reporting a 1966 study, contends that much of the 
leadership for militant action by teachers comes from officers of estab-
lished teacher's organizations as well as "behind-the scenes informal 
leaders". He also found that there was no significant difference in 
militancy between NEA and AFT officers® 
As the militant actions of teachers' organizations become more 
similar and the differences in tactics and ideologies converge, the NEA 
and the AFT as organizations become indistinguishable® This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis One: There will be no significant difference in 
militancy between the negotiators for the NEA and the 
negotiators for the AFT. 
Professionalism 
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Corwin (1970) states the professional educator is one who seeks to 
control and monopolize his vocation. The basis for these efforts stems 
from the belief that educators are professional. Since the late 1800's, 
American educators have tended to band together in order to discuss 
common problems, to exchange viewpoints in relation to common concerns, 
and to formulate strategies for bringing about needed changes in the 
educational programs and organizational structures with which they were 
associated. Most of today's educators recognize the need for, and 
encourage the greater professional development of the teaching staff and 
their representative organizations which serve public and private educa-
tional institutions. What aspiring professionals seem to require are 
new ways of approaching the issues of developing teacher professionalism. 
Corwin states that today's teachers, through their organizational frame-
work, are becoming increasingly active in such matters as academic free-
dom, professional rights, responsibilities to students and to 
administrators, and their role in the development of the policies, 
rules, and regulations which effect their status as professional 
educators (Corwin, 1970). 
Teachers' organizations are stirring. They are organized pressure 
groups who, as a result of bargaining power through unified effort, 
bring about changes in the governance structures in the schools 
(Shank.er, 1969)~ 
Cogen .( 1963, p. 22)., states that: 
Collective bargaining has created, at least in elemental 
form, a new climate of freedom and professionalism in our 
schools. The spirit of freedom is the outcome of the proce-
dural innovations. Its components are emancipation, self-
expression, and self-determination. These have instilled a 
new sense of professionalism in our halls of learning. 
Batchelder (1969) contends that although teachers in general are 
dedicated to their profession, this does not indicate that they are 
content to make do with what input into governance they are given. 
Teachers, through organizational efforts, strive for the things which 
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their expertise as educators dictate are needed for themselves and their 
students. Teachers are being frustrated by a lack of freedom to teach, 
by a lack of adequate teaching conditions, and by a lack of status which 
coexists with one of the lowest salaries in the professions. 
To be effective today, our profession must be unified and 
strong. We must enroll those teachers who are not yet enrolled. 
We must involve them in the planning and operation of a pro-
fession. In designing a professional program we must consider 
the judgment and expertise of those who will be instrumental 
in the implementation of the programs which the interests of 
the students demand (Batchelder, 1969, p. 139). 
Teachers have pressed and will continue, through newly developed 
organizational procedures, to press for improved teaching standards 
(Shanker, 1969). Batchelder lends support to Shanker's contention by 
stating that in many states teachers' organizations are saying to the 
public and to the lay boards and their administrative representatives, 
when educational standards are too low or teaching-learning conditions 
too poor, services rendered by professionals may not be providedm "By 
setting decent educational standards and holding to them, we as teachers 
are developing professional autonomy" (Batchelder, 1969). 
Corwin (1955, 1966, 1969), Batchelder (1969), and Robinson (1967) 
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agree that as schools have increased in size and complexity of function, 
the need for more specialization has caused the majority of teachers to 
believe that they, through their organizational leaders, should exercise 
the ultimate authority over major educational decisions. The teachers' 
organizations are attacking the causes of their professional frustra-
tions through efforts to initiate procedures for negotiations, sound 
local, state, and national legislation, and the firm belief that the 
quality of education depends upon the extent to which teachers' organi-
zations give primacy to the welfare of students. 
Boyan (1969, p. 201) assesses the professionalization of teachers 
in the following statement: 
The aspirations of teachers as professionals in public 
bureaucracies and the militant behavior of teachers as mem-
bers of extra-school organizations have brought sharp con-
frontations with the traditional authority structure of the 
school •••• It is at the point of difference between the 
administration's social control of organizational discipline 
and their social control of the supervisory dimension of 
authority that the emergent role of the teacher as an 
aspirant professional thrusts him into confrontation with 
the authority structure. The confrontations have focused 
on achieving two aspirations. The first is establishing 
an acceptable or collegial base for decision-making as an 
expert endeavor. The second aspiration springs from 
challenges to the competence of administrators to assess 
teaching performance. 
Norman Robinson, in a 1967 study, reported that teachers are 
achieving increased professional status. They are receiving longer 
periods of pre-service training, have formed tight-knit organizations 
for representation, and that they are demanding more and more control 
over their work environment (Robinson, 1967). 
Corwin (1970), in a report of a 1966 study, stated that the most 
important basis of the teacher's sense of power is the growth of 
specialization in teaching areas. Many teachers, through their 
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organization, are beginning to assert that they must be afforded the 
right to significant input to the decision-making process which controls 
their professional situation. Both the professional association and the 
union are insisting upon the right of teachers to participate with 
boards of education and their administrative representatives in deter-
mining the policies of common concern and conditions of professional 
service. 
Colombotas, in a study reported in Corwin (1970), examined how the 
sociological backgrounds of teachers are associated with their profes-
sional orientations@ Among his was the presence of a relationship 
between men teachers and their participations in the AFT, though not 
with their participation in NEA. More salient to the study at hand was 
the fact that there were no significant differences in professionalism 
between members of the AFT and the NEA. 
Corwin (1970) compared officers of NEA with officers of AFT and 
found no significant differences in professionalism. 
The preceding section of the review of literature suggests the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Two: There will be no significant difference. in 
professionalism as shown by the negotiators for the NEA as 
compared with professionalism as shown by negotiators for 
the AFT. 
Labor-Management Orientation 
The goals of teachers' organizations which are engaged in collec-
tive bargaining or collective negotiations are multi-dimensional. These 
goals include, as a minimum: (1) surviving as an organization; 
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(2) improving the conditions of employment; (J) promoting education as 
a profession; (4) raising salaries to a point which is on, par with 
other professions; (5) providing a superior educational opportunity for 
the youth; (6) controlling jobs for the membership of the organization; 
(7) formulating and jointly administering, with the administration, a 
system for the adjudication of grievances and the resolution of disputes 
arising during the contract period; (8) having a part in the decision-
making processes (Darland, 1971), (Schmidt, Parker, and Repas, 1967). 
The primary function of any employee organization is to 
improve the wellbeing of its membership and to enhance their 
established rights. Collective negotiations should not pro-
vide employees with the power to 'write their own ticket 1 , 
but to provide for their effective participation in the estab-
lishment of terms and conditions of employment (Taylor, 1969, 
p. 158). 
Doherty and Oberer (1967, p. 22) state that it is rare that two 
organizations, the NEA and the AFT, which were, "so markedly dissimilar 
in orgin, structure, and style should come to pursue identical objec~ 
tives in a similar fashion". Collective bargaining has created circum-
stances which have forced a great many affiliates of the NEA to adopt 
functions and even an outlook more typical of trade unions than of pro-
fessional organizations. "The AFT has veered from its appointed course. 
The AFT 1 s interest in problems of education, distinct from the employ-
ment relationship, indicates an effort to achieve professional 
respectibili ty." 
By 1970 teacher organizations had undergone a transfor-
mation. They had shed their faith in the benevolence of boards 
of education and the rhetoric of liberalisms They had become 
classroom-teacher oriented and extremely tough-minded about 
economic status and the right to engage in negotiations to 
influence the policies which most effect them (Darland, 1971, 
p. 64). 
Hipp (1967, p. 257) reinforces Darland by stating: 
The insistence on the part of the organized teacher that 
the circumstances of teaching must be favorable and that 
teacher's own personal interests should be advanced, has led 
more and more teacher groups to demand formal professional 
negotiations agreements. Teachers' organizations, whether 
NEA or AFT, want boards of education to sit down and give 
teachers a voice in the determination of policy. 
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The NEA, espousing the position of a professional organization, has 
felt that it should be as much, if not more, concerned with the compe-
tence of its members as about their economic welfare and other condi-
tions relating to job performance. By 1966, however, faced with 
pressures to win representation elections and the duty to represent 
teachers, NEA seems to have shifted from the obligation of the profes-
sion to judge performance, to a more vigorous push for teachers' rights. 
"The lesson, evidently, is that if one competes with a union, one ends 
up playing by the union's rules" (Doherty and Oberer, 1967, p. 28). 
Lavine, Doherty, and Scanlon state that the successes of the AFT in 
negotiations with New York City in 1961-1962 substantially influenced 
the NEA in its policies toward collective bargaining. The NEA could 
either play the union's game of collective bargaining·- professional 
negotiations - and exclusive representation or be faced with a loss of 
power in the urban and large suburban arease The NEA chose to play the 
union game and in doing so adopted many union practices in the process. 
Salary requests became salary demands. Consultation became professional 
negotiation. Teachers who had never dreamed of "bilateral determination 
of employment conditions" were becoming acquainted with the jargon of 
trade unionism (Doherty, 1969), (Lavine, 1970), (Scanlon, 1968). 
In terms of policy and outlook, the NEA and the AFT are moving ever 
closer together: ( 1) The .AFT has always been a unified membership 
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organization and in recent years a vigorous NEA campaign has resulted in 
twenty-eight states adopting unified membership plans; (2) Both organi-
zations take a serious interest in the improvement of instruction, as 
evidenced by the More Effective School Program of the AFT affiliate in 
New York and the Center for the Study of Instruction developed by the 
NEA; (3) Both organizations, NEA through work for professional prac-
tices boards and .AFT through its Quality Educational Standards in 
Teaching (QUEST) program, are emphasizing the drive to become a profes-
sion; (~) Three substantial locals of AFT and NEA have voted to merge, 
those in Flint, Michigan, Los Angeles, and the State of New York; (5) 
Both the NEA and the AFT publish major periodicals. NEA publishes: 
the NEA Reporter, Today's Education, and the Journal of Teacher Educa-
tion, among many, and the AFT publishes the American Teacher and 
Changing Education (Darland, 1971), (Jamison, 1969), (Stinnett, 1969), 
(Scanlon, 1968), (Lavine, 1970). 
The challenge of the AFT has produced drastic changes in the NEA: 
The development of the NEA's Urban Project which is responsible for 
teachers' negotiations; over 10 per cent of the NEA 1 s budget is now 
being spent on teacher negotiations; and in districts where representa-
tion elections were held and eligibility to vote was determined by an 
impartial person, principals and other administrators have been excluded 
from the unit of representation (Moskow, 1967). 
Doherty and Oberer (1967, p~ ~1), reporting an analysis of the dif-
ferences between .·AFT and NE:A contracts, state: 
Our conclusion, then, guided solely by the scope of the 
collective agreements negotiated by both teacher organizations, 
is that there is very little difference between the two when it 
comes down to the manner in which teachers are to be represented 
at the local level~ In a great many cases NEA affiliates are 
beginning to act very much like trade unions. When an NEA 
affiliate participates in a representation election, wins the 
election and assumes the role of exclusive bargaining agent, 
enters into negotiations with the employer over comprehensive 
agreement, goes out on strike when its terms are not met, 
wins the strike and administers the agreement with vigor and 
determination--when an affiliate does all of this, it does 
not seem right to speak of it as anything but a union. The 
struggle between NEA and AFT has become not a contest between 
rival ideologies, 'professionalism' and •trade unionsim•, but 
between rival unions. 
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William T. Lowe (1967) reports a study of 531 teachers from a school 
district which has AFT and NEA members on its staff. The study con-
sisted of a comparison of NEA, AFT, and unaffiliated teachers' responses 
to a detailed questionnaire to attempt to determine whether any signifi-
cant differences occurred between the teachers who joined NEA or AFT or 
chose to remain unaffiliated. Some of the conclusions were: NEA and 
AFT members could not be distinguished on the basis of tenure in their 
present assignment; there was no relationship between amount of expe-
rience and membership in AFT or NEA; marital status was not related to 
membership in NEA or AFT; AFT members were lower in morale than NEA 
members; there were no significant differences in the perceptions of NEA 
and AFT members as to whether the board of education helped in improving 
staff competence; the objective for teaching for NEA and AFT teachers 
seemed to be identical. 
On the basis of conversations with teachers and local 
leaders of NEA and AFT affiliates, the NEA, AFT, and unaffil-
iated teachers in this community are identical in terms of 
their educational backgrounds, their sincere interest in 
children and their dedication to the profession (Lowe, 1967, 
p. 251±). 
The review of literature leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Three: There will be no significant differences 
in labor-management orientation as expressed by negotiators 
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for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by negotiators for the 
AFT. 
Contracts 
In the 1960 1s, the NEA was forced to re-evaluate its position 
toward professional negotiations. It could either "play the union's 
game", the two chief rules of which were exclusive recognition and col-
lective bargaining, or it could face the possibility of being eased out 
of the picture as an organization which looked after the teachers' 
interests. The NEA chose 11 to play". Sometimes the NEA has demanded 
representation elections before the union could muster sufficient 
strength to win. Once elected as the exclusive bargaining agent, the 
association negotiated comprehensive very "union-like agreements" 
(Doherty and Oberer, 1967, p. 33). 
The National Education Association and the American Federation of 
Teachers have, at the national and state level, a staff of individuals 
who work full-time with the local affiliate in the negotiation of con-
tracts with boards of education. These national and state employees 
of the NEA and the AFT gain extensive experience in the negotiation. of 
contracts in different districts. When they arrive at a district to 
assist in the negotiations, they are loaded with comparative information 
which may be of great help to the local association or union. 
As a result of the convergence of attitudes by the NEA and the AFT, 
many of the formerly non-negotiable subjects are now items which are 
commonly found in negotiated contracts. The NEA booklet, Professional 
Negotiations: Selected Statements of School Board, Administrator, 
Teacher Relationship, first published in 1963, was designed as a guide 
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for local associations which were contemplating formalizing relation-
ships with their school boards. In the 1963 and 1964 editions, the 
majority of examples of professional agreements consisted of Level I and 
Level II types of agreements. Level I agreements provided for recogni-
tion of the local association. Level II agreements provided for recog-
nition plus an outline of procedures to be used during negotiations. In 
the 1965 edition, there was only one example of Level I agreements and 
one example of Level II agreements. The remaining examples were Level 
III agreements. Level III agreements are comprehensive labor-management 
contracts. "It needed only to be said that by 1965 the NEA had come 
around to accepting the same type of elaborate document the AFT had long 
been advocating" (Doherty and Oberer, 1965, p. J6). 
In its 1969 publication, How to Negotiate, the NEA does not mention 
Levels I and II. Instead, information and suggestions as to how the 
local association should negotiate a comprehensive agreement are given. 
The proposal should be so written that if the board 
accepted it in its entirety, the teachers' desires would 
be fulfilled and their frustrations terminated •••• The 
association should propose everything that the teachers 
wish to achieve and for which legitimate argument can be 
provided (NEA, 1969, P~ 17). 
Charles Cogen, in a speech given to the National Institute on 
Collective Negotiations in Public Education in 1965, stated: 
We place no limit on open negotiations--the items which 
are subject to the bargaining process. Anything on which 
the two parties can agree should become part of the agree-
ment; anything on which they cannot agree will, of course, 
not appear. I look for a great expansion in the effective 
scope of negotiations. Anything having to do with the 
operation of the school is a matter for professional concern 
and it should thus be subject to collective bargaining. 
Lieberman and Moskow (1966, p. 416) describe a typical contract as 
would be negotiated by either the American Federation of Teachers or 
the National Education Association in the following manner: 
A typical contract is a written agreement between an 
employer and a employee organization, usually for a definite 
term, defining conditions of employment (wages, hours, 
vacations, overtime, working conditions), rights of employees 
and employee organization, and procedures to be followed in 
settling disputes or handling issues that arise during the 
life of the agreement. 
Shils and Whittier (1968) state that the AFT insists on contracts 
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which include the following subject areas: recognition as the exclusive 
bargaining agent; specified working conditions; grievance procedures 
with binding arbitration; dues checkoff; fringe benefits; and conditions 
affecting education as a profession. 
Dashield, in a 1969 NEA publication, lists appropriate articles for 
a comprehensive agreement. The articles are taken from contracts cur-
rently in effect and reported to the NEA. Local associations should 
negotiate in the areas below, but should not limit themselves to this 
list. 
Article 1 Definitions 
Article 2 General Provisions 
Article 3 Recognition 
Article 4 Negotiation Procedure 
Article 5 Grievance Procedure 
Article 6 Rights of Teachers 
Article 7 Rights of Exclusive Representation 
Article 8 Teaching Hours and Teaching Load 
Article 9 Class Size 
Article 10 Teacher Assignments and Relief From Non-Teaching 
Duties 
Article 11 Vacancies and Promotions 
Article 12 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Article 15 
Article 16 
Article 17 
Article 18 
Article 19 
Article 20 
Article 21 
Article 22 
Article 23 
Article 24 
Article 25 
Article 26 
Article 27 
Article 28 
Article 29 
Article 30 
Transfers (Voluntary and Involuntary) 
Leaves of Absence 
Group Insurance and Hospitalization 
In-Service Education 
Protection for Teachers 
Academic Freedom 
Employment Standards 
Curriculum Improvements 
Teaching Conditions 
Student Discipline 
Teacher Evaluation and Teacher Files 
Student Teachers 
Paraprofessionals, Teacher Aides, Teaching 
Specialists 
Salary Policies and Payroll Procedures 
Summer and Evening Schools 
School Calendar 
Equal Educational Opportunity 
Payroll Deductions 
Duration and Amendment 
(NEA, 1969). 
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The essence of the formalized employer-employee relationship is the 
collective agreement or contract$ This contract or agreement sets 
forth in detail employment conditions which have been bilaterally deter-
mined between the teachers or their representatives and the board of 
education or its representatives. 
The National Education Association recommends to its state and 
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local affiliates a process which is called "professional negotiations". 
The American Federation of Teachers advocates "collective bargaining". 
The differences between professional negotiations and collective bar-
gaining, when viewed in light of these approaches, tend to be differ-
ences in semantics. Shils and Whittier (1968, p. 125) list the 
similarities between the approaches of the AFT and the NEA: 
1. Both NEA and AFT seek provisions for direct, face-to-face, 
relationships between teachers or their duly elected or 
appointed representatives and the board of education or 
their duly elected or appointed representatives. 
2. Both NEA and AFT seek legislation at the state level in 
order to formally establish this face-to-face 
relationship. 
3. Both NEA and AFT seek written contracts.which specify 
the means and terms of the relationship. 
~. Both NEA and AFT, in the event of an ultimate decision 
which is unsatisfactory to the teachers, will employ 
the strike as a bargaining weapon. 
In the representation elections held thus far in education, the 
associations and the federations have repeatedly tried to include or 
exclude groups on organizational grounds. One such case involved repre-
sentation proceedings for the Milwaukee Board of Vocational and Adult 
Education. The Milwaukee Vocational Teachers Union (AFT) requested a 
representation election, whereupon the Milwaukee Vocational and Adult 
Schools Education Association (NEA) requested that it be placed on the 
ballot. The union objected, on the grounds that the association was not 
a "labor organization" within the meaning of the Wisconsin statute pro-
viding that public employees shall have "the right to be represented by 
labor organizations of their own choice." Thus, the NEA affiliate had 
to prove it was a labor organization, which it did to the satisfaction 
of the WERB. The Board emphasized that the important issue was the 
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nature of the organization, not its lable, and that the activities of 
the association were very similar to those of the federation (Lieberman 
and Moskow, 1966, pp. 132-133). 
The negotiation of agreements between an association representing 
the teachers and the board of education or its designated representative 
is becoming more common. Shils and Whittier (1968) list one purpose of 
their book is to alert the boards of education and their superintendents 
to the fact that both the National Education Association and the 
American Federation of Teachers mean business in their respective 
approaches to negotiations. They further contend that there is very 
little if any difference in the impact on school administration whether 
their association which organizes the teachers is the NEA or the AFT. 
Lieberman and Moskow (1966) state that "some people" feel that the 
crucial distinction between professional negotiations as practiced by 
the local affiliates of the National Education Association, and callee-
tive bargaining as practiced by the local affiliates of the American 
Federation of Teachers, is professionalism. Collective bargaining as a 
process is inherently limited or should be inherently limited to bread 
and butter issues; whereas, professional negotiations is thought to 
encompass a much wider range of teacher concerns. This view is question-
able since "the scope of contracts negotiated by local affiliates of 
the AFT are very nearly the same as the scope of agreements reached by 
the NEA. 11 
The 1966 agreement reached between the New Haven Teachers 
League and the New Haven Board of Education, illustrates the 
similarities of the NEA versus the AFT approach to negotiations. 
An article-by-article analysis of the contract reveals nothing 
significantly different from agreements reached through collec-
tive bargaining. The similarity illustrates the fallacy of 
assuming that agreements reached under one procedural label are 
different from agreements reached under a different proce-
dural label (Lieberman and Moskow, 1967, p. 9). 
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Doherty and Oberer (1967, pp. 38-39) reviewed negotiated contracts 
and concluded that there was little difference in the scope and subject 
matter of bargaining whether the local affiliat~ of the NEA or the AFT 
was responsible for the negotiations. 
The subject matter of agreements in Rochester, New Haven, 
and Newark, where Associations are the bargaining agents, is 
in the main no less comprehensive than it is in the contracts 
negotiated by the Federation in New York City, Boston, and 
Philadelphia •••• 
Our conclusion, then, guided solely by the scope of the 
collective agreements negotiated by both teacher organiza-
tions, is that there is very little difference between the 
two when it comes to the manner in which teachers are to be 
represented at the local level. 
The preceding review of selected literature leads the writer to 
state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Four: There will be no significant difference in 
contracts negotiated by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to 
contracts negotiated by negotiators for the AFT. 
For testing purposes, Hypothesis Four will be divided into six sub-
hypotheses tdentifiedbythe contract categories as defined in Chapter I. 
Hypothesis Four (a): There will be no significant difference 
in provisions for Organizational Security between contracts 
negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated 
in AFT affiliated districts. 
Hypothesis Four (b): There will be no significant difference 
in provisions for Exchange of Facts and Views between contracts 
negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated 
in AFT affiliated districts. 
Hypothesis Four (c): There will be no significant difference 
in the number of Professional Considerations between contracts 
negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negoti-
ated in AFT affiliated districts. 
Hypothesis Four (d): There will be no significant difference 
in the number of Employee Considerations between contracts 
negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negoti-
ated in AFT affiliated districts~ 
Hypothesis Four (e): There will be no significant difference 
in provisions for Impass Resolution between contracts negoti-
ated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in 
AFT affiliated districts. 
Hypothesis Four (f): There will be no significant difference 
in Grievance Procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA 
affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affili-
ated districts. 
~o 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the selection of the sample, the instrumenta-
tion, the collection of data, the treatment of data, and the statistical 
analysis used in the present investigation. 
Sample Selection 
Population 
The population from which the sample was drawn consisted of all 
school districts in the Region Five of the State of Illinois (Figure 1) 
which conduct face-to-face negotiations between representatives of the 
faculty organizational unit and the governing board of the school dis-
trict or its representatives. 
These face-to-face negotiations must result in a written agreement 
which satisfies the following criteria (Doherty and Oberer (1967), Shils 
and Whittier (1968): 
(1) Organizational security; 
(2) Exchange of facts and views; 
(3) Conditions of employment; 
(4) Impass resolution; 
(5) Grievance procedure. 
The Office of the 
Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 
State of Illinois 
Michael J. Bakalls 
Superintendent 
Figure 1. Map of the Regions of the State of 
Illinois 
s 
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Region Five of the State of Illinois was selected as the geographi-
cal area from which the sample would be drawn for the following reasons: 
(1) The writer had been employed in this region and was 
familiar with many school district administrators. 
It was felt that this familiarity would enhance the 
possibilities for cooperation in the study. 
(2) Region Five contained a variety of sizes and types of 
school districts. 
(3) The researcher had relatives in the area. If visits 
to the participating school districts became necessary, 
the financial burden could be lightened. 
The first step in securing the population from which the sample was 
drawn was to contact the state office of the Illinois American Federa-
tion of Teachers and the state office of the Illinois Education Asso-
ciation. The purpose of contacting these two organizational 
headquarters was to obtain a list of those school districts in Region 
Five of the State of Illinois which are engaged in face-to-face negotia-
tions with the elected representatives of the faculty unit. The Execu-
tive Secretary of the Illinois Federation of Teachers indicated that he 
would be happy to supply the names and addresses of those school dis-
tricts in Region Five of the State of Illinois which are engaged in 
face-to-face negotiations with an affiliated local of the American 
Federation of Teachers. The information was sent within the week. 
The researcher contacted the state office of the Illinois Education 
Association. Following instructions received from an official of the 
Association, the writer spoke with the Field Representative for Region 
Five. The writer was informed that the names and addresses of those 
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school districts in Region Five which are engaged in face-to-face 
negotiations with a local affiliate of the Illinois Education Associa-
tion would be supplied. 
The Illinois Education Association listed twenty-one (21) school 
districts in Region Five which were engaged in face-to-face negotiations 
with local affiliates of the National Education Association. The 
Illinois American Federation of Teachers supplied a list of eleven (11) 
school districts in Region Five which were engaged in face-to-face 
negotiations with local teachers unions affiliated with the American 
Federation of Teachers. 
Sample Districts 
Six school districts were randomly selected from the list supplied 
by the Illinois Education Association. Six school districts were ran-
domly selected from the list supplied by the Illinois American Federa-
tion of Teachers. 
The superintendents of each of these twelve (12) school districts 
received a letter asking them to participate in the study (see Appendix 
A). Two affirmative responses were received during the two weeks wait-
ing period. At the end of the waiting period, the first follow-up 
letter was mailed to those districts which did not respond. Three 
affirmative responses were received during the three-week period. At 
the end of the waiting period, the second follow-up letter was mailed to 
the remaining districts. After three weeks, no affirmative responses 
were received. The writer then drove to Illinois where interviews 
regarding participation in the study were held with three superinten-
dents. Telephone conversations regarding participation in the study 
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were conducted with the remaining four superintendents. All twelve of 
the districts agreed to participate in the study. One school district 
which negotiated with a local of the American Federation of Teachers was 
dropped at a later date because of an insufficient number of respon-
dents among the negotiators. 
The districts comprising the sample indicate a varied economical 
base. The predominate economic base of each school district used in the 
study is presented in Table I. The letter 11 A11 designates a National 
Education Association affiliate. The letter 11 B11 designates an American 
Federation of Teachers affiliate. 
District 
A1 
A2 
AJ 
A4 
AS 
A6 
B1 
B2 
BJ 
B4 
BS 
TABLE I 
ECONOMIC BASE OF SAMPLE DISTRICTS 
Base 
Residential 
Residential-Agricultural 
Residential-Military 
Agricultural 
Agricultural 
Residential-Agricultural 
Residential 
Industrial-Residential 
Mining-Agricultural 
Industrial-Residential 
Industrial 
'=i:6 
The school districts in the sample range from primarily residential 
through primarily agricultural to primarily industrial. The NEA dis-
tricts tend to be more residential-agricultural in economic base; 
whereas, the AFT districts have a tendency toward a residential-
industrial base. 
The eleven districts vary somewhat in wealth. In the following 
table (Table II), the assessed valuation, assessed valuation per stu-
dent, and rank in per pupil wealth of unit districts in Illinois for the 
1970-1971 fiscal year are shown. 
TABLE II 
THE ANNUAL EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT, THE ASSESSED VALUATION PER STUDENT 
AND DISTRICT RANK IN ASSESSED VALUATION PER PUPIL 
FOR UNIT DISTRICTS IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
FOR THE 1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR 
Annual Assessed District Rank by Assessed 
District Expenditure Valuation Valuation Per Pupil 
Per Student Per Student (high= 1; low= '=i:19) 
A1 $712 $ 7,726 '=i:13 
A2 8'=i:9 17,331,i, 311,i, 
A3 801 7 ,161 '=i:16 
A'=i: 738 16, 153 327 
A5 809 1'=i:,509 351,i, 
A6 825 22,075 223 
B1 836 12,2'=i:6 380 
B2 871 11,839 385 
B3 730 9,911 '=i:01 
B'=i: 923 16,182 326 
B5 760 55,756 8 
The eleven districts ranged in wealth from an assessed valuation 
per pupil of $7,726 which is ranked 413 to an assessed valuation per 
pupil of $55,756 which is ranked 8th. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 
1956) was used to test whether the school districts negotiating with 
the AFT affiliate differ significantly in wealth from school districts 
negotiating with NEA affiliates. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test 
indicate that the two distributions are from the same population; the 
groups do not differ significantly in wealth. 
The per pupil expenditures of the eleven districts ranged from a 
low of $712 to a high of $923. The mean expenditure per child among the 
districts is $804. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) was used to 
test whether the school districts which negotiated with an American 
Federation of Teachers affiliate differ significantly in per pupil 
expenditure from school districts which negotiated with an affiliate 
of the National Education Association. The results of the Mann-Whitney 
U Test indicate that the two distributions are from the same population; 
therefore, do not differ significantly in per pupil expenditure. 
The eleven districts vary in student population. In the following 
table (Table III) the student population for each of the districts used 
in the study is presented. 
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TABLE III 
THE AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE PER DISTRICT 
District Average Daily Attendance 
Ai 3,365 
A2 4,869 
AJ J,742 
A4 1,708 
A5 971 
A6 2,477 
Bi 7,692 
B2 19,815 
BJ 1,644 
B4 1J,J66 
B5 618 
The eleven districts which were used in the study ranged in Average 
Daily Attendance from a low of 618 in District B-5 to a high of 19,815 
in District B-2. The mean Average Daily Attendance for the sample was 
5,479. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test whether 
the school districts which negotiated with an affiliate of the American 
Federation of Teachers differs significantly in Average Daily Attendance 
from school districts which negotiated with an affiliate of the National 
Education Association. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate 
the two distributions are from the same population; therefore, do not 
differ significantly in Average Daily Attendance. 
The Sample 
The sample used in this study included all of the negotiators who 
represented the eleven boards of education in face-to-face negotiations 
and all of the negotiators who represented the eleven teacher's organi-
zations in face-to-face negotiations. 
In the following table (Table IV), the total number of negotiators 
per district who represented the board of education in face-to-face 
negotiations; the number of board of education negotiators per district 
who responded to the instrument packet, the total number of negotiators 
per district who represent the local teachers' organization in face-to-
face negotiations, the number of local teacher's organization negotia-
tors per district who responded to the instrument packet, and the total 
number of negotiators per district who responded to the instrument 
packet are presented. 
The range in total number of negotiators was from American Federa-
tion of Teachers District B-2 with two negotiators, one board of educa-
tion negotiator, and one teacher's union negotiator to American 
Federation of Teachers District B-1 with thirteen negotiators, six board 
of education negotiators, and seven teacher's union negotiators. The 
range in per cent of negotiators responding was from American Federation 
of Teachers District B-1 with a 54 per cent response to four districts 
with a 100 per cent response. The total number of negotiators was 96. 
The total number of respondents was 77. The rate of return among the 
negotiators in the eleven districts was Bo per cent. 
TABLE IV 
THE NUMBER OF NEGOTIATORS PER DISTRICT AND THE NUMBER OF 
NEGOTIATORS WHO RESPONDED PER DISTRICT 
Negotia- Total Board Total Teacher 
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Total 
tors Board Team Team Team Negotiators 
District Total Team Responding Teachers Responding Responding 
A1 9 5 4 4 3 7 
A2 6 3 1 3 3 4 
AJ 8 4 4 4 3 7 
A4 7 4 4 3 3 7 
A5 10 5 5 5 5 10 
A6 10 5 5 5 5 10 
B1 13 6 2 7 5 7 
B2 2 1 1 1 1 2 
BJ 11 6 6 5 3 9 
B4 13 7 3 6 6 9 
B5 7 4 2 3 3 5 
Instrumentation 
Measuring Professionalism 
Corwin (1963) developed The Professional Orientation Scale as an 
instrument to be used in the investigation of staff conflicts in public 
schools. This instrument, which measures the teachers' professional 
orientation, consists of sixteen items which use a Likert-type scale for 
scoring purposes. These sixteen items are divided among four sub-
scales. The sub-scales will not be utilized. The total score, 
"professionalism" will be used (Corwin, 1963), (Oborny, 1970). 
51 
In the development of the instrument, Corwin selected sixteen items 
from a large number of items which were constructed. This selection 
process included judgment of face validity by a panel of sociologists 
and testing of discrimination power in relation to total score. Corwin 
then randomly assigned the items to two groups. The reliability of the 
instrument was estimated by applying the Spearman-Brown formula. The 
split-half correlation of the two sets of items was .65 corrected. 
Corwin used the known group technique for validation of the scale. 
Teachers who had five or more years of teaching experience, had pub-
lished two or more articles, had held an office in a professional 
association, or had been professionally active were considered the high 
professional group. The low professional group consisted of full- or 
part-time teachers who subscribe to a maximum of one professional 
journal, had not published, were not active in professional organiza-
tions. Since the mean scores of the two groups differed significantly 
at the .01 level, the Professional Orientation Scale was judged to 
discriminate between groups who have high professional orientation and 
groups who have low professional orientation (Corwin, 1963). 
For the purposes of the current study, it was felt that the word 
"professional" may have "emotionally charged meanings" for some of the 
negotiators in the sample. The title of the scale was changed to "Views 
of the Teacher I s Job" (Oborny, 1970). 
The reliability of "Views of the Teacher's Job" was estimated for 
the sample used in this study by applying the Spearman-Brown formula. 
The items in the scale were randomly assigned to two groups. The split-
half correlation of the two sets of items when corrected was r .76. 
n 
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Measuring Militancy 
Corwin (1963) developed the Initiative-Compliance Scale (The Way I 
See It as a part of an investigation of staff conflict in the public 
schools. This scale, which may be considered a measure of militancy, 
consists of twelve hypothet'ical situations which have the potential for 
producing conflict situations between teachers and administrators 
(Fairman, 1970), (King, 1972). These hypothetical situations were 
based on real incidents which were found in case studies, legal cases, 
and literature on role conflicts (Corwin, 1963). One sample of the 
hypothetical situatio~s used in the scale follows: 
The assistant principal told .a teacher that he was too 
'outspoken' in criticizing certain policies of the school and 
that this was causing unrest among faculty members. Imagine 
yourself as the teacher (Corwin, 1963, p. 192). 
The respondent was asked to put himself in the place of the teach-
ers in this situation and to respond on a Likert-type scale to a 
question. 
The question is: 'What would you do in this situation?' 
The possible alternatives are: Comply with superior's 
request; try to compromise; seek support of colleagues; 
ask for an investigation by a professional organization; 
refuse to comply with the request (Corwin, 1963, p. 192). 
Corwin (1963) further indicates that the set of responses was 
weighted from one to six in the order given. The reaction to the ques~ 
tion: "What would you do in this situation?" would indicate an index of 
the amount of initiative or compliance which the respondent is willing 
to assume. The lower the respondent's score on this question, the more 
compliance he displays to the administration. The higher the respond-
ent's score on this question the more initiative the respondent is 
willing to assume. 
53 
Corwin established the validity of the scale by comparing the 
actual number of conflicts which were reported by teachers during inter-
views with their scores on the instrument. The difference between the 
mean scores of the group with a high number of conflicts and the group 
with a low number of conflicts was statistically significant beyond the 
.01 level. The instrument was judged to discriminate between groups 
which show initiative and those who show compliance. 
The split-half reliability was r= .74 and when corrected with the 
Spearman-Brown formula was r = .85. 
n 
The reliability of The Way I See It was determined for the sample 
used in this study by applying the Spearman-Brown formula to the 
obtained scores. The items in the scale were randomly assigned to two 
groups. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items when 
corrected was rn = .75. 
Measuring Labor-Management Attitudes 
The Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire was developed by 
Helper (1953) to measure "deep-seated, long range attitudes and beliefs 
of individuals toward labor and management." One hundred-eighteen 
statements, about which people who are oriented toward labor might 
disagree with people who are management oriented were constructed. A 
panel of experts judged the items as to labor or management orientation. 
The items were administered to 120 students at the Ohio State Univer-
sity. The scores on the items were subjected to item analysis. The 
forty items showing the strongest discrimination were selected as the 
final form of the questionnaire. 
This finalized form was administered to a group of individuals who 
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were members of a local Junior Chamber of Commerce and another group of 
men who were union leaders and shop stewards. Helper then computed a 
11 t 11 test for groups with different n's. The difference between group 
means was significant beyond the .01 level. The test was judged to 
discriminate between groups which have a "deep-seated, long range 
orientation toward labor" and groups which have "deep-seated, long 
range orientations toward management" (Helper, 1953). 
The reliability of the questionnaire was determined by the test-
retest method. The questionnaire was readrninistered to fifty of the 
original respondents ten weeks after the first administration. The 
reliability was found to be .85 (Helper, 1953). 
The reliability of the Labor Management Attitudes Questionnaire was 
determined for the sample used in this study by applying the Spearman-
Brown formula to the obtained scores. The items were randomly assigned 
,, 
to two groups. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items when 
correlated was rn .96. 
The validity of the Labor Management Attitudes Questionnaire was 
determined for the sample used in this study by computing a 11 t 11 test 
for groups with different n's. The sample was split into management 
negotiators and employee negotiators. The mean scores for the two 
groups were computed. The difference between group means was statis-
tically significant beyond the .001 level. The test was judged to 
discriminate between the two groups in the sample. 
Data Collection 
Upon agreeing to participate in the stud~ each superintendent was 
given the option of either receiving the instrument packets and 
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instructions by mail or having the writer deliver the packets and infor-
mation personally (see Appendix B for instrument packet and instruc-
tions). Nine superintendents opted to receive the instrument packets 
and instructions by mail. Two superintendents chose to have the instru-
ment packets delivered by the writer. 
The instructions and instrument packets were identical whether they 
were mailed or delivered. The superintendent was requested to distrib-
ute the packets to all individuals who are engaged in face-to-face 
negotiations between the board of education and the teachers' organiza-
tion; the superintendent was asked to supply the number of negotiators 
for each of the two negotiating teams; and to mail a copy of the 
finished contract to the writer. 
The instrument packet contained instructions to the negotiator, a 
copy of the Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire, Views of the 
Teachers' Job, The Way I See It, answer sheets, and a demographic ques-
tionnaire. The instructions requested the negotiator to respond to the 
instruments in the order which they are found, insert the finished 
instruments, answer sheets, and demographic questionnaire into the self-
addressed, stamped envelope, then place the envelope in the mail (see 
Appendix B). 
The eleven sets of instrument packets were either delivered or 
mailed to the participating school superintendent who distributed them 
to the negotiators as per instructions. After one month, a follow-up 
letter was mailed to the superintendent, asking him to urge the negotia-
tors to respond to the instrument packet and return it to the writer. 
After three weeks, a second follow-up letter was mailed to the super-
intendent. Two weeks later a third follow-up letter was mailed, it was 
decided that due to the low rate of return a more personal appeal to 
the negotiators was warranted. A letter was sent to the superintendents 
of the eleven participating districts asking for a list of the names and 
addresses of the individual negotiators. After waiting three weeks, all 
superintendents who had not responded with the requested list were con-
tacted personally by telephone. 
Using the names and addresses supplied by the superintendent, an 
instrument packet with instructions was mailed to each negotiator. The 
instructions stated that the negotiator was to disregard this instrument 
packet if he had previously responded. The first follow-up letter was 
mailed three weeks after the packets were sent to the negotiators. 
After three weeks, the second follow-up letter was mailed to the nego-
tiators. After three weeks, a personal telephone call was placed to 
each negotiator. •. The negotiator was urged to respond to the instrument 
packet if he had not previously done so. If the returns from a particu-
lar district were low enough, i.e., less than 50 per cent, a second 
telephone call was made to all negotiators in that district. Each 
negotiator was urged to return the instrument packet if he had not done 
so. 
Efforts seeking additional responses from negotiators ceased after 
a return rate of 80 per cent of the total number of negotiators was 
reached (see Table IV). 
A letter was then sent to each superintendent expressing gratitude 
for the cooperation received and requesting the following information: 
A copy of the contract which was negotiated by the negotiators used in 
the study; and the number of years which the board of education had been 
engaged in face-to-face negotiations with the teachers' organization. 
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After two weeks, a personal telephone call was made to those super-
intendents who had not responded. All eleven contracts were received. 
Treatment of Data 
Scoring the Instruments 
Responses to the Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire, Views of 
the Teachers' Job, and The Way I See It were hand scored by the writer. 
These scores, along with the information from the demographic question-
naire were transfered to score sheets. These sheets were presented to 
the Oklahoma State Computer Center where the information was trans-
ferred to IBM cards and verified to be correct. 
Analyzation of Contracts 
The contracts which were negotiated in each of the eleven sample 
districts were analyzed in relation to the presence or absence of spe-
cific provisions within each of the six individual categories as out-
lined in Chapter I of this study. The following discussion relates the 
procedures of analyzation in detail. Each of the five categories was 
treated individually. The category scores were achieved by summing the 
provisions which were included. 
I. Organizational Security: This category contains those 
provisions which protect the status of the employee 
organization. 
A. Exclusive Recognition: The acceptance by the board of 
education of an organization as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the bargaining unit. Scored as one point. 
B. Rights of Exclusive Representation: The right and 
obligation of the employee organization to bargain 
collectively for all employees in the negotiations 
unit which they represent. Scored as one point. 
C. Dues Check Off: The employer agrees to deduct 
the organizational dues from the employee's wages 
and reimburse the organization. Scored as one 
point. 
D. Negotiating Unit: Defines the occupational group 
or groups which the employee organization repre-
sents in negotiations. If administrators are 
excluded, this provision is scored as one point. 
E. Availability of Facilities: Provides for the use 
of district or building facilities for employee 
organizational purposes. Scored as one point. 
F. Election Procedures: The procedures used to elect 
a rival organization to represent the employee 
unit in negotiations. Scored as one point. If 
the percentage of the negotiating unit needed on 
the petition for election exceeds thirty and 
percentage of negotiating unit needed for election 
of rival organization is above fifty, add one extra 
point. 
G. Length of Agreement: The number of years the contract 
is in effect. Scored as one point for each year the 
contract is in effect. 
II. Exchange of Facts and Views: A provision which insures 
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the exchange of information which is pertinent to the 
negotiations process. Scored as one point. 
III. Conditions of Employment: Provisions which affect the 
members of the Negotiations unit as employees or as 
professional educators. This category was divided into 
two parts; the teacher as an educator and the teacher 
as an employee. Each provision within each part is 
scored as one point. 
A. Educational Conditions: A provision which deals 
with the teaching-learning relationship, curricu-
lum, student evaluation, teacher evaluation, or the 
fulfillment of duties as an educator. Each provision 
is scored as one point. 
1. Teacher evaluation 
2. Teacher assignment 
3. Curriculum committees 
4. Textbook committees 
5. Administrator-faculty conferences 
6. Employment requirements 
7. Student discipline 
8. Educational planning committee 
9. Professional growth (academic) 
10. Preparation period 
11. Student evaluation 
12. In-service training 
13. Faculty meetings 
14. Maximum class size 
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15. Sabbatical leave 
16. Scope of negotiations 
17. Professional consultation (outside experts) 
18. Student orientation 
19e No unnecessary classroom interruptions 
20. Parent conferences 
21. Released time for department chairmen 
22. Program improvement 
23. Assignment of remedial classes (rotation) 
24. Administrator search committee 
25. Teaching conditions committee 
26. Availability of student I s cumulative folders 
27. Varied teaching experiences within areas of expertise 
28. Academic freedom 
29. Teacher I s aids 
B. Employee Considerations: Any physical, temporal, or 
financial condition which deals with the member of the 
·teachers' negotiating unit as an employee. Each provi-
sion is scored as one point. 
1. Len~th of. s~hool year 
2. Length of school day 
J. Salary schedule and conditions 
4. Sick leave 
5. Maternity leave 
6. Bereavement leave 
7. Personal leave 
8. Hospitalization insurance 
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9. Placement on salary schedule (credit for service 
outside of district) 
10.. Payroll procedures 
11. Extracurricular activities (assignment to) 
12. Seniority 
1.3. Legal assistance to teachers in case of assault 
14. Fringe benefits 
15. Complaint procedure (not a grievance) 
16. Notification of vacancies prior to release to 
general public 
17s Personnel files open to individual teacher 
18. Protection against assault 
19. Promotion policies 
20. Substitution pay scale for covering individual 
classes 
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21. Compensation for teaching extra class (above 5 per day) 
22. Leave of absence 
2.3. Budgetary planning committee 
24. No custodial duties 
25. Teachers ' lounge 
26. Length of faculty meetings 
27. Publication of all teachers salaries 
28. Permission to leave building and grounds during 
lunch and non-scheduled time 
29. Administrative job descriptions 
.30. Inter-faculty cooperative class substitution in case 
of emergency absence of teacher 
31. Job description for coaches 
32. Emergency leave 
33. Transfer policies 
J4. Teacher parking 
35. Identification cards 
36. Release from non-teaching duties 
37. Duty free lunch period 
JS. Room assignment (criteria for) 
39. Procedures for being assigned to summer school 
40. Merit pay for punctuality 
41. Athletic passes 
42. Notification of supervisor's visit 
43. Teacher work room 
44. Separation of teachers' lunch and toilet facilities 
from students' 
45. Tax sheltered annuity 
46. Disposition of accumulated earned absences 
47. Cost of living increases 
48. Severence pay 
49. Teacher' s ma i 1 boxes 
50. Credit Union 
IV. Impass Resolution: Provisions which prescribe the procedures 
for resolving deadlock situations during negotiations. 
A. Steps 
1. Formal notification of impass. Scored as one point. 
2. Mediation. Scored as one point. 
J. Fact-Finding. Scored as one point. 
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B. Agency Used for Final Appeal: If the agency is outside 
of the school district's or bargaining agent's control, 
score as one point. 
C. Binding Final Appeal: If the final decision by the 
mediator or fact finder is binding, score one point. 
D. No Strike Provision. Score as one point. 
E. Good Faith Bargaining. Score as one point. 
V. Grievance Procedure: The formalized processes for dealing 
with any complaint or expressed dissatisfaction by an 
employee in connection with the terms of his employment as 
set forth in the agreement. 
A. Formal Steps: 
1. Submission to principal. Score one point. 
2. Appeal to superintendent. Score one point. 
J. Appeal to board of education. Score one point. 
4:. ' Arbitration. Score one point. 
B. Agency Used for Arbitration: If the agency is outside 
the control of the board of education and the bargaining 
unit, score one point. 
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c. Binding Arbitration: If arbitrator's decision is binding, 
score one point. 
Statistical Analysis 
The total sample consisted of seventy-seven negotiators. These 
negotiators were divided into four categories. The forty-four NEA 
negotiators were divided into twenty-one teacher negotiators and 
twenty-three board negotiators. The thirty-three AFT negotiators were 
6l.t: 
divided into eighteen teacher negotiators and fifteen board negotiators. 
The size of the four categories led to the selection of the Mann-Whitney 
U Test of significance for the analyzation of the responses to the three 
instruments. Siegel (1956) states that the Mann-Whitney U Test is the 
most powerful of the nonparametric tests and is a very useful alterna-
tive to the 11 t 11 test. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to determine 
whether two independent groups were drawn from the same population. 
The total number of contracts which were analyzed in the current 
study was eleven. Six contracts were negotiated in NEA affiliated dis-
tricts and five contracts were negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. 
The size of the two groups of contracts led to the selection of the 
Mann-Whitney U Test of significance for the analyzation of these 
contracts. 
The demographic data were divided into two groups according to the 
same affiliation criteria as presented for contracts. These data were 
analyzed for differences by applying the Mann-Whitney U Test of signifi-
cance. The demographic data and the contract category scores were 
analyzed for relationships by applying the Spearman Rank Correlation 
technique (Siegel, 1956). 
The .05 level of significance was selected prior to the analysis of 
the data as the level which must be attained before the null hypothesis 
would be rejected. Since the hypotheses do not indicate direction, all 
probabilities reported will be two-tailed. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
The presentation of data as they pertain to the previously stated 
hypotheses will be reported in this chapter. The researcher adopted the 
.05 level of significance for acceptance of hypotheses. Since the 
hypotheses which have been stated are non-directional, the probability 
values presented in this chapter will be two-tailed. 
Hypothesis One 
H.1. There will be no significant difference in militancy 
between negotiators for NEA and negotiators for the 
AFT. 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a significant 
difference in militancy existed between the NEA teacher negotiators and 
the AFT teacher negotiators. The calculated U was 90.5. The calculated 
U-prime was 287.5. The resulting Z score was -2.78, which has a prob-
ability of occurrence of .005. The difference in militancy between the 
NEA teacher negotiators and the AFT teacher negotiators was statisti-
cally significant beyond the .05 level. The hypothesis was rejected. 
Data relevant to this test are presented in Table V. 
TABLE V 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITANCY BE'IWEEN NEA 
TEACHER NEGOTIATORS AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
66 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Teacher Negotiator 21 90.5 287.5 -2.78 .005 
AFT Teacher Negotiator 18 
Corwin (1963) stated that a score above the mean indicated a higher 
degree of militancy than a score below the mean. 
The mean militancy score for all teacher negotiators was 41.41. 
The mean militancy score for NEA teacher negotiators was 37.76. The 
mean militancy score for AFT teacher negotiators was 45.06. Data anay-
sis indicated the AFT teacher negotiators tended to be higher in mili-
tancy than did the NEA teacher negotiators. Data pertinent to this 
discussion are presented in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
MEAN MILITANCY SCORES FOR TEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
Sample Mean N 
Total Teacher Negotiators 39 
NEA Teacher Negotiators 37.76 21 
AFT Teacher Negotiators 45.06 18 
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Hypothesis Two 
H.2. There will be no significant difference in professionalism 
as shown by negotiators for the NEA as compared with pro-
fessionalism as shown by negotiators for the AFT. 
A Mann-Whitney Test was computed to determine if there was' a sta-
tistically significant difference in professionalism between NEA teacher 
negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators. The computed U was 188. The 
computed U-prime was 190. The resulting Z score was -0.028, which has a 
probability of occurrence of .977. The difference in professionalism 
between NEA teacher negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators was not sta-
tistically significant. The hypothesis was accepted. Data pertinent to 
this test are presented in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROFESSIONALISM BETWEEN 
NEA TEACHER NEGOTIATORS AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Teacher Negotiators 21 188 190 -0.028 .977 
AFT Teacher Negotiators 18 
Corwin (1963) stated that a score above the mean indicated a higher 
degree of professionalism. A score below the mean indicated a lower 
degree of professionalism. 
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The mean professionalism score for the teacher negotiators in the 
sample was 56.86. The mean professionalism score for NEA teacher nego-
tiators was 57.05. The mean professionalism score for the AFT teacher 
negotiators was 56.67. Analyzation of the data indicated that both 
groups of teacher negotiators tended to score near the mean. The groups 
did not differ significantly in professionalism. Data pertinent to 
this discussion are found in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN PROFESSIONALISM SCORES FOR 'lEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
Sample 
Total Teacher Negotiators 
NEA Teacher Negotiators 
AFT Teacher Negotiators 
Hypothesis Three 
Mean 
56.86 
57.05 
56.67 
H.J. There will be no significant difference in labor-
management orientation as expressed by negotiators 
for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by 
negotiators for the AFT. 
N 
39 
21 
18 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a 
statistically significant difference in labor-management between the NEA 
negotiators and the AFT negotiators. The computed U was 360.5. The 
computed U-prime was 1091.0. The resulting Z score was -3.763 which has 
a probability of occurrence of .0016. The difference in labor-
management attitude between the NEA negotiators and the AFT negotiators 
was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data 
relevant to this test are presented in Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
MANN-WHITNEY TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE 
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
Sample N u u.:.prime z Probability 
NEA Negotiators 44 360.5 1091.0 -3.7630 .00016 
AFT Negotiators 33 
Helper (1953) and Horvat (1968) stated that a higher score, above 
128, indicated an identification with labor. The higher the score 
became the stronger the identification with labor. A score between 120 
and 128 indicated a neutral identification. A low score, below 120, 
indicated an identification with management. The lower the score became 
the stronger the identification with management. The mean labor-
management attitude score for all negotiators in the sample was 125.72. 
The mean labor-management attitude score for the NEA negotiators was 
116 .36. The mean labor management attitude score for the AFT negotiators 
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was 137.~2. Data analysis indicated that the NEA negotiators tended to 
identify with management while the AFT negotiators tended to identify 
with labor. The difference in labor-management attitude between the 
two groups was statistically significant. Data relevant to this dis-
cussion ar-e found in Table X. 
TABLE X 
MEAN LABOR-MANAGEMENT SCORES FOR THE NEGOTIATORS 
IN THE SAMPl.E 
Sample Mean 
Total Negotiators 125.72 
NEA Negotiators 116 .36-
AFT Negotiators 137 -~2 
N 
77 
33 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a 
statistically significant difference in labor-management attitude 
between NEA teacher negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators. The com-
puted U was ~9.50. The computed U-prime was 328.5. The resulting Z 
score was -3.93, which has a probability of occurrence of .00008. The 
difference in labor-management attitude between the negotiator groups 
was statistically significant. Data germaine to this test are presented 
in Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
MANN-WHITNEY TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
ATTITUDE BETWEEN NEA TEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS 
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Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Teacher Negotiators 49.50 -3.93 .00008 
AFT Teacher Negotiators 33 
The mean labor-management attitude score for the teacher negoti-
ators in the sample was 141.94. The mean labor-management attitude 
score for NEA teacher negotiators was 129.38. The mean labor-management 
attitude score for AFT teacher negotiators was 154.50. Data analyzation 
indicates that the two groups identify with labor but the AFT teacher 
negotiators have a significantly stronger identification with labor than 
do the NEA teacher negotiators. Data pertinent to this discussion are 
presented in Table XII. 
TABLE XII 
MEAN LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE $,CORES FOR THE TEACHER 
NEGOTIATORS IN THE SAMPLE 
Sample 
Total Teacher Negotiators 
NEA Teacher Negotiators 
AFT Teacher Negotiators 
Mean 
141.94 
129.39 
154.50 
N 
41 
21 
18 
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A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a 
statistically significant difference in labor-management attitude 
between NEA board negotiators and AFT board negotiators. The computed 
U was 87.0. The computed U-prime was 258.0. The resulting Z score was 
-2.55 which has a probability of occurrence of .001. The difference in 
labor-management attitude between NEA board negotiators and AFT board 
negotiators was statistically significant. Data relevant to this test 
are presented in Table XIII. 
TABLE XIII 
MANN-WHITNEY U 1EST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
ATTITUDE BE'IWEEN NEA BOARD NEGOTIATORS 
AND AFT BOARD NEGOTIATORS· 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Board Negotiators 23 87.0 258.0 -2.55 .001 
AFT Board Negotiators 15 
The mean labor-management attitude score for the board of education 
negotiators was 111.8~. Themeanlabor-management attitude score for NEA 
board negotiators was 103.35. The mean labor-management attitude score 
for AFT board negotiators was 120.33. Data analysis indicates that NEA 
board negotiators tended to have a significantly stronger identification 
with management than do the AFT board negotiators. Data pertinent to 
this discussion are presented in Table XIV. 
Sample 
TABLE XIV 
MEAN LABOR-,MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE SCORES FOR THE BOARD 
NEGOTIATORS IN THE SAMPLE 
Mean 
Total Board Negotiators 111.84: 
NEA Board Negotiators 103.35 
AFT Board Negotiators 120.33 
Hypothesis Four 
H.4:. There will be no significant difference in contracts 
negotiated by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to 
contracts negotiated by negotiators for the AFT. 
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N 
38 
23 
15 
For testing purposes, hypothesis four will be divided into six sub-
hypotheses. These six sub-hypotheses are identified by the contract 
categories as defined in Chapter I. 
Hypothesis Four (a) 
H.4:(a). There will be no significant difference in provisions 
for organizational security between contracts nego-
tiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts 
negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U test was computed to determine if a significant 
difference in provisions for organizational security existed between 
. l, 
contracts negotiated in NEA districts and contracts negotiated in AFT 
districts. The computed U was 11. The U-prime was 19. The resulting 
Z score was -0.75 which has a probability of occurrence of 0.45. The 
difference in provisions for organizational security between contracts 
in NEA districts and contracts in AFT districts was not statistically 
significant. The hypothesis was accepted. Data pertinent to this test 
are presented in Table XV. 
TABLE XV 
MANN-WHITNEY U '!EST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVISIONS FOR 
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY BETWEEN NEA 
CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 11 19 -0.75 o.45 
AFT Contracts 5 
All sample contracts included provisions for exclusive recognition 
and exclusive representation. Three NEA contracts and three AFT con-
tracts contained provisions for dues check off. Four AFT contracts and 
three NEA contracts excluded administrators and supervisors from the 
teachers' bargaining unit. Eight contracts, four NEA and four AFT, 
contained provisions which made district facilities and buildings avail-
able to the teacher's organization .• Six contracts, four NEA and two 
AFT, contained procedures by which a rival teachers organization may be 
elected to replace the organization currently recognized. Two contracts, 
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both AFT, were negotiated for a two-year period. The remaining nine 
contracts were negotiated for a one-year period. Data relevant to this 
discussion are presented in Table XVI. 
TABLE XVI 
PROVISIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS 
Availability 
Negotiations of School Length of 
Exclusive Exclusive Dues Unit Excludes Facilities for Org. % Needed % to Tenure of Agree.ment 
Score Rank Recognition Reeresentation Check Off Administrators Puq~oses for Petition Win Election i,n Years 
Al 6 6 x x x x x None 1 
AZ 6 6 x x x x None 1 
A3 7 9 x x x x x 30% Majority Term of Contract 1 
or 1 year 
A4 6 6 x x x x 30% llajority Term of Contract 1 
or 1 year 
A5 5 3.5 x x 30% Majority Term of Contract 1 
or 1 year 
A6 4 1.5 x x 30% Majority Term of Contract 1 
or l year 
Bl 4 1.5 x x x None 1 
B2 7 9 x x x x x None 2* 
B3 5 3.5 x x x x None 1 
B4 8 11 x x x x x 30% Majority Term of Contract 2* 
BS 7 9 x x x x 50%* 66% Term of Contract 
or 1 year 
Subtotal A 6 6 3 4 4 4 6 
Subtotal B 5 5 3 4 4 2 5 
Total 11 11 6 8 8 6 11 
* Scored as 2 points. 
-,J 
O"'I 
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Hypothesis Four (b) 
H.4(b). There will be no significant difference in provisions for 
exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotiations be-
tween contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts 
and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney Test of significance was computed to determine if a sig-
nificant difference in provisions which insure exchange of facts and views 
which are pertinent to the negotiations process existed between NEA con-
tracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 4:o. The U-prime was LJ:5. The 
resulting ZwasO.O, which has a probabilityofoccurrenceof 1.0. The dif-
ference in provisions for the exchange of facts and views which are,pertinent 
to negotiations was not statistically significant. The hypothesis was 
accepted. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XVII. 
TABLE XVII 
MANN-WHITNEY U 1EST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVISIONS FOR THE 
EXCHANGE OF FACTS AND VIEWS PERTINENT TO NEGOTIATIONS 
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 0 1.0 
AFT Contracts 5 
All sample contracts contained provisions for the exchange of facts 
and views pertinent to negotiations. 
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Hypothesis Four (c) 
H.4(c). There will be no significant difference in the number 
of educational considerations between contracts nego-
tiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts 
negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
a significant difference in the number of provisions which deal with the 
teacher as an educator or the fulfillment of his duties as an educator 
existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was O. 
The U-prime was 25. The resulting Z score was -2.76 which has a proba-
bility of occurrence of .005. The difference in the number of educa-
tional considerations between NEA contracts and AFT contracts was 
statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data pertinent 
to this test are presented in Table XVIII. 
TABLE XVIII 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUMBER OF 
EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS BETWEEN NEA 
CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z 
NEA Contracts 6 0 25 -2.76 
AFT Contracts 5 
Probability 
.005 
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The 11 .sample contracts contained 29 separate provisions which deal 
with the teacher as an educator or the fulfillment of his duties as an 
educator. The score for this category was calculated by summing the 
number of professional provisions in the contract. The data pertinent 
to the following discussion are presented in Table XIX. 
The range in number of educational provisions in the sample con-
tracts was from a NEA contract with one to an AFT contract with fifteen. 
The mean number of provisions for the sample was eight. The mean number 
of provisions for the NEA contracts was four. The mean number of pro-
visions for the AFT occurrence was 12. Five contracts, two NEA and 
three AFT, contained provisions for teacher evaluations. Eight con-
tracts, five AFT and three NEA, contained provisions which stated that a 
teacher must be qualified in a subject area to teach classes in that 
field. Three AFT contracts and two NEA contracts provided for the in-
clusion of teachers on curriculum committees. Six contracts, three NEA 
and three AFT, provided for administrator-teacher conferences. Eight 
contracts, five NEA and three AFT, required that all teachers have state 
certification before they are employed. Three contracts, all AFT, pro-
vided for faculty meetings. Three AFT contracts and one NEA contract 
had provisions which dealt with maximum class size. Four AFT contracts 
and no NEA contracts provided for sabbatical leave. Four AFT contracts 
and no NEA contracts specified that unnecessary classroom interruptions 
were prohibited. Only one contract, AFT, provided for academic freedom. 
Only one contract, NEA, provided for teacher aides. 
TABLE XIX 
EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Administrator-
Teacher Teacher Curriculum Textbook Faculty 
Score Rank Evaluation Assignment Committee Cmmnittee Conferences 
Al 4 3 x x x 
A2 4 3 x 
A3 7 6 x x x 
A4 3 3 x x 
AS 1 1 
A6 6 5 x x x 
Bl 15 11 x x x x 
B2 14 10 x x x 
B3 9 8 x 
B4 8 7 x x x x 
BS 10 9 x x x x 
Subtotal A 2 3 2 2 3 
Subtotal B 3 5 3 2 3 
Total 5 8 5 4 6 
IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS 
Employment Student 
Requirements Discipline 
x 
x 
x x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x x 
x 
x x 
5 2 
3 3 
8 5 
Educational 
Planning Professional 
Committee Growth 
x x 
x 
x 
x 
1 1 
1 2 
2 3 
Preparation 
Period 
x 
x 
x 
0 
3 
3 
co 
0 
Student 
Evaluation 
x 
x 
0 
2 
2 
In Service 
Training 
x 
x 
0 
2 
2 
Faculty 
Meetings 
x 
x 
x 
0 
3 
3 
Maximum 
Class 
Size 
x 
x 
x 
x 
1 
3 
4 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Sabbatical 
Leave 
x 
x 
,._ 
x 
x 
0 
4 
4 
Scope of 
Negotiations 
x 
1 
0 
1 
Professional 
Consul ta tor 
x 
1 
0 
1 
Student 
Orienfation 
x 
0 
1 
1 
No Unnecessary 
Classroom 
Interruptions 
x 
x 
x 
x 
0 
4 
4 
Parent 
Conferences 
x 
0 
1 
1 
•,> 
a, 
I-' 
Released Time 
for Depart, 
Chairman 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Program 
Improvement 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Assignment 
of Remedial 
Class.es 
x 
0 
1 
1 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Administrator Teaching 
Search Conditions 
Committees Conmittee 
x x 
.. 
0 0 
1 1 
1 1 
Availability 
of St11dent 
Files 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Varied 
Teaching 
Experiences 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Academic Teacher 
Freedom Aids 
x 
0 
1 
1 
JI: 
1 
0 
1 
CD 
l\) 
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Hypothesis Four (ct) 
H.4(ct). There will be no significant difference in the number 
of employee considerations between contracts negotiated 
in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated 
in AFT affiiiated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
a significant difference in the number of provisions which effect the 
teacher as an employee existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. 
The computed U was 0.5. The U-prime was 29.5. The resulting Z score 
was -5.44 which has a probability of occurrence of .00003. The differ-
ence in the number of employee considerations between NEA contracts and 
AFT contracts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was 
rejected. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XX. 
TABLE XX 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEE 
CONSIDERATIONS BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 .5 29.5 -5.44 .00003 
AFT Contracts 5 
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The 11 sample contracts contained 51 separate provisions which deal 
with the teacher as an employee. The score for this category was cal-
culated by summing the number of employee provisions in the contract. 
The mean number of employee provisions for the 11 contracts in the 
sample was 13. The mean number of employee provisions in the NEA con-
tract was seven. The mean number of employee provisions in AFT con~ 
tracts was 19. 
Five AFT contracts and one NEA contract provided for the length of 
the school year. Nine contract, five NEA and four AFT, contained salary 
schedules. Five AFT contracts and no NEA contracts provided that super-
vision of extracurricular activities would be on a voluntary basis and 
when the teacher volunteered, he would be reimbursed for the time in-
volved. Five AFT contracts and one NEA contract provided for the publi-
cation of vacancies within the school district before the information 
was released to the general public. Three contracts, two AFT and one 
NEA, provided for protection of the teacher against physical assault. 
Four AFT contracts and one NEA contract stipulated the length of faculty 
meetings. Five AFT and no NEA contracts stipulated that faculty members 
may leave the buildings and grounds during unassigned periods. Four AFT 
and no NEA contracts contained transfer policies. Three AFT contracts 
and no NEA contracts contained seniority provisions. Three AFT contract 
tracts and one NEA contract provided a fonnula by which teachers would 
receive summer school teaching assignments. Data relevant to this dis-
cussion are presented in Table XXI. 
Length 
Score Rank of Year 
Al 14 5 x 
A2 16 6.5 
A3 3 2 
A4 5 3.5 
AS 5 3.5 
A6 2 1 
Bl 22 10 x 
B2 26 11 x 
B3 16 6.5 x 
B4 17 8.5 x 
BS 17 8.5 x 
Subtotal A 1 
Subtotal B 5 
Total 6 
Table XXI 
EMPLOYEE CONSIDERATIONS IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS 
Length Salary Sick Maternity Berevement Personal Hospital 
of Day Schedule Leave Leave Leave Leave Insurance. 
x x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
" x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x x 
1 5 3 3 1 3 2 
1 4 5 2 3 4 3 
2 9 8 5 4 7 5 
Placement 
on Salary 
Schedule 
x 
x 
2 
0 
2 
Payroll 
Procedure 
x 
x 
2 
0 
2 
co 
Vl 
Extra Curricular 
Activities Shall 
be Voluntary and Legal Assistance 
Reimbursed Seniority to Teachers 
x x x 
x x x 
x x 
x 
x x 
0 0 0 
5 3 3 
5 3 3 
TABLE XXI (Continued) 
Fringe Complaint Publication 
Benefits Procedure of Vacancies 
x 
x 
x x 
x 
x 
x 
;. 
x 
x 
x 
2 2 1 
0 0 5 
2 2 6 
Open Personal 
Reports 
x 
x 
2 
0 
2 
Protection 
Against 
Assault 
x 
x 
x 
1 
2 
3 
Promotion 
x 
x 
x 
1 
2 
3 
co 
O'\ 
TABLE XXI-(Continued) 
Substitution Planning 
Pay for Individ. Extra Class Leave of CoD111ittee Custodial 
Classes Compensation Absence (Budgetory) Duties 
x x x 
x 
x 
x 
x x 
x 
,,_ 
x x 
2 1 2 1 0 
2 1 0 0 2 
4 2 2 1 2 
Length of 
Teacher's Faculty 
Lounge Meetings 
x 
x x 
x x 
x 
x 
x 
0 1 
3 4 
3 5 
Publicatieih 
of Teacher's 
Salary 
x 
x 
1 
1 
2 
ex:, 
---.] 
Permission 
to Leave 
Building 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
0 
5 
5 
Administrative 
Job 
Descriptions 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Cooperative 
Class 
Substitution 
x 
0 
1 
1 
TABLE XXI (Continued) 
,._ 
Job Description 
for Coaches 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Fm.ergency 
Leave 
x 
x 
0 
2 
2 
Transfer 
Policies 
x 
x 
x 
x 
0 
4 
4 
Teacher 
Parking 
x 
0 
1 
1 
I.D. 
Cards 
x 
x 
0 
2 
2 
0:, 
0:, 
. 
Release- ·From Duty Free. 
Non-Teaching Lunch Room 
Duties Period Assignment 
x x 
x x x 
x 
x 
x 
1 1 0 
2 3 1 
3 4 1 
TABIE XXI (Continued) 
Point System Merit P!!y 
for Summer for 
Assignment Puncuality 
x 
1,. x x 
x 
x 
1 0 
3 1 
4 1 
Notification 
Athletic 'Of Supervisor's 
Passes Visit 
x x 
0 0 
1 1 
1 1 
Private 
Telephone 
x 
1 
0 
1 
00 
'° 
Teacher 
Work 
Room 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Separation of 
Student and . 
Teacher Facilities 
x 
0 
1 
1 
TABLE XXI (Continued) 
Tax Sheltered 
Annuity 
x 
x 
0 
2 
2 
" 
Pay for 
Accumulated. 
Earned 
Absences 
x 
x 
1 
1 
2 
Cost of 
Li'.Ving 
Increase 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Severence 
Par 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Teacher's 
Mailboxes 
x 
0 
1 
1 
Credit 
Union 
x 
0 
1 
1 
'° 0 
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Hypothesis Four (e) 
H.~(e). There will be no significant difference in provisions 
for impass resolution between contracts negotiated in 
NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in 
AFT affiliated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U test was computed to determine if a significant 
difference in provisions for impass procedures existed between contracts 
negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT 
affiliated districts. The computed U was JO. The U-prime was O. The 
resulting Z score was -2.91 which has a probability of occurrence of 
.003. The difference in impass procedures between contracts negotiated 
in NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated districts was statisti-
cally significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data relevant to this 
test are presented in Table XXII. 
TABLE XXII 
MANN-WHITNEY U '!EST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPASS PROCEDURES 
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 JO 0 -2.91 .003 
AFT Contracts 5 
92 
Six NEA contracts contained procedures to be followed when a dead-
lock occurs in the negotiations process. No AFT contract contained such 
procedures. The first formal step in impass procedures in the six NEA 
contracts was a notification to the board negotiations team that an 
impass situation existed. The second step was mediation by an outside 
agency. The outside agency is usually the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliations Service. In the six contracts the findings are binding. 
Three of the NEA contracts contained "no strike" provisions. All six 
NEA contracts contained provisions which guarantee that bargaining will 
be conducted in good faith. Data relevant to this discussion are pre-
sented in Table XXIII. 
Step l 
Notification of 
Score Rank Impass 
Al 4 6.5 x 
A2 6 11 x 
A3 5 9 x 
A4 5 9 x 
AS 5 9 x 
A6 4 6.5 x 
Bl 0 3 None 
B2 0 3 None 
B3 0 3 None 
B4 0 3 None 
BS 0 3 None 
TABLE. XXIII 
IMPASS PROCEDURES IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS 
Step 2 Step 3 
Agency Used for Final Appeal 
Mea~:lition Fact-Finding Final Appeal Binding 
x Federal meadition and con-
sultation service 
x x Federal mediation and con-sultation service 
x Office of Education 
State of Illinois 
x x Federal mediation and 
consultation service 
x Federal mediation and 
consultation service 
x Chief Justice 4th circuit State of Illinois 
No Strike Good Faith 
Provision . Bargaining 
x 
x x 
x x 
x 
x x 
x 
'° \,,.) 
Hypothesis Four (f) 
H.4(f). There will be no significant difference in grievance 
procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affil-
iated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT 
affiliated districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically 
significant difference in grievance procedures existed between NEA con-
tracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 27. The U-prime was 3. 
The resulting Z score was 2.33 which has a probability of occurrence of 
.02. The difference in grievance procedures between NEA contracts and 
AFT contracts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was re-
jected. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXIV. 
TABLE XXIV 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 27 3 2.33 .02 
AFT Contracts 5 
All sample contracts contained grievance procedures. Ten con-
tracts, six NEA and four AFT, contained three formal appeal steps. Step 
one was the building principal; Step two was the superintendent of 
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schools; Step three was the board of education. Six NEA contracts and 
two AFT contracts provided for arbitration as the fourth and final step. 
Eight contracts, six NEA and two AFT, used an outside agency for the 
selection of the arbitrators. Six contracts, three NEA and three AFT, 
stipulated that the arbitrators' decision was binding. One AFT con-
tract had no formal grievance procedure. All grievances were handled on 
an informal basis through the union grievance committee. The final dis-
position of the grievance was decided by a vote by the unit membership. 
Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table .XXV. 
TABLE XXV 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Final -~ Agency Used . Final St!!P 
Score Rank Principal Superintendent Board of Ed. Arbitr<21tion Step for Final Step llinding 
Al ·5 6 x x x x Arbitration Fed. mediation and con-sultation service 
A2 5 6 x x x x Arbitration AAA 
A3 6 10 x x x x Arbitration AAA -x 
A4 5 6 x x x x Arbitration AAA 
AS 6' 10 x x x x Arbitration AAA x 
A6 6 10 x x x x Arbitration Chairman chosen by Chief x Justice of 4th judicial 
circuit of Illinois 
Bl 4 2.5 x x x Decision Board of Education x 
B2 5 6 x x x x Arbitration AAA x 
B3 4 2.5 x x x Decision Board of Education x 
B4 5 6 x x x x Arbitration Union and board arbitration panel outside Chairman 
BS 3 1 - no formal steps* - Vote. Local union membership 
* Contract BS has no formal greivance procedure; however, the greivances are processed by the union greivance committee. The 
informal steps consist of appeals to the b.uilding principal and the board of education. 
'° 
°' 
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Supplementary Data 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically 
significant difference in age existed between NEA negotiators and AFT 
negotiators. The calculated U was 18. The U-prime was 12. The result-
ing Z score was 0.155 which had a probability of occurrence of .59. The 
difference in age between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts and 
negotiators in AFT affiliated districts was not statistically signifi-
cant. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXVI. 
TABLE XXVI 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF AGE OF NEGOTIATORS 
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Negotiators 4:4: 18 12 0.55 .59 
AFT Negotiators 33 
The age of the negotiators in the sample ranged from a minimum of 
24 years to a maximum of 59 years. The mean age of all negotiators in 
the sample was 39.2 years. The ages of the NEA negotiators ranged·from 
24 to 59, with a mean of 39.9. The NEA teacher negotiators ranged in 
age from 24 to 56 with a mean of 35.8. The NEA board negotiators ranged 
from 29 to 59 with a mean of 43.6. The ages of the AFT negotiators 
ranged from 24 to 55 with a mean of 38.3. The AFT teacher negotiators 
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ranged in age from 24 to 46 with a mean age of 33.1 years. The AFT 
board negotiators ranged from 32 years to 55 years with a mean age of 
44.6 years. There tended to be little difference between AFT negotia-
tors and NEA negotiators in relation to age. Data pertinent to this 
discussion are presented in Table XXVII. 
All Negotiators 
All NEA Negotiators 
NEA - Teacher 
NEA - Board 
All AFT Negotiators 
AFT - Teacher 
AFT - Board 
TABLE XXVII 
AGE OF NEGOTIATORS 
Mean Max. 
39.2 59 
39.9 59 
35.8 56 
4J.6 59 
38.3 55 
33.1 46 
44.6 55 
Min. Range 
24 35 
24 35 
24 32 
29 JO 
24 31 
24 22 
32 23 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically 
significant difference existed in the number of years of experience in 
education between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts and AFT affil-
iated districts. The computed U was 20. The U-prime was 10. The 
resulting Z score was 0.91 which has a probability of occurrence of .36. 
The difference in age between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts 
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and negotiators in AFT affiliated districts was not statistically sig-
nificant. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXVIII. 
TABLE XXVIII 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
BE'.IWEEN NEA AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Negotiators 20 10 0.91 .36 
AFT Negotiators 33 
The number of years of experience in education for all negotiators 
in the sample ranged from 0.0 years to 37.0 years. The mean number of 
years of experience for all negotiators in the sample as 10.3 years. 
The range in years of experience for all NEA negotiators was from 0.0 to 
37.0 with a mean of 11.8. The range in years of experience for NEA 
teacher negotiators was 3.0 years to 26.0 years with a mean number of 
years of experience of 10.3. The range in years of experience for NEA 
board negotiators was from 0.0 to 37.0 years with a mean of 13.1 years 
of experience. The range in years of experience for all AFT negotiators 
was 0.0 to 23.0 years. The mean years of experience for all AFT negoti-
ators was 8.3. The number of years of experience for AFT teacher nego-
tiators was 3 to 21 years with a mean of 9.0 years of experience. The 
range in years of experience for AFT board negotiators was 0.0 to 23.0 
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years with a mean of 7.5 years of experience. The difference between 
NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators in regard to the number of years of 
experience as educators was not statistically significant. Data rele-
vant to this discussion are found in Table XXIX. 
TABLE XXIX 
NUMBER OF YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION FOR NEGOTIATORS 
Mean Max. Min. Range 
All Negotiators 10.3 37 0 37 
All NEA Negotiators 11.8 37 0 37 
NEA - Teacher 10.3 26 3 23 
NEA - Board 13.1 37 0 37 
All AFT Negotiators 8.3 23 0 23 
AFT - Teacher 9.0 21 3 18 
AFT - Board 7.5 23 0 23 
A Mann~Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a sta-
tistically significant difference in the degrees held by negotiators in 
NEA affiliated districts as opposed to negotiators in AFT affiliated 
districts. The computed U was 22. The U-prime was 8. The resulting 
Z score was 1.28 which has a probability of occurrence of .20. The 
number and type of degrees held by NEA negotiators was not significantly 
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different from the number and type of degrees held by AFT negotiators. 
Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXX. 
TABLE XXX 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF S~GNIFICANCE OF DEGREES HELD 
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
Sample N u U-prime z 
NEA Negotiators 22 8 
AFT Negotiators 33 
Probability 
.20 
The degrees held by negotiators in the sample ranged from no degree 
to a doctorate in Education. Thirteen negotiators, all board of educa-
tion, held no degree, 22 negotiators held a Bachelor's degree, 38 nego-
tiators held a Master's degree, 3 negotiators held a Educational 
Specialist degree, and one negotiator held a Doctor of Education degree. 
Five NEA negotiators held no degree, 11 held a Bachelor's degree, 25 
held Master's degree, two held Educational Specialist degrees, and one 
held a Doctor of Education degree. Nine NEA teacher negotiators held 
Bachelor's degrees, and 12 held Master's degrees. Five NEA board nego-
tiators held no degrees, two held a Bachelor's degree, 13 held Master's 
degrees, two held Educational Specialist degrees, and one held a Doctor 
of Education degree. Eight AFT negotiators held no degree, 11 held 
Bachelor's degrees, 13 held Master's degrees, and one held an.Educational 
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Specialist degree. Ten AFT teacher negotiators held Bachelor's degrees 
and eight held Master's degrees. Eight AFT board negotiators held no 
degree, one held a Bachelor's degree, five held Master's degrees, and 
one held an Educational Specialist degree. Data relevant to this dis-
cussion are found in Table XXXI. 
TABLE XXXI 
DEGREES HELD BY NEGOTIATORS 
None B.S. M.S. Ed.S. Ed.D. 
Total 13 22 38 3 1 
NEA 5 11 25 2 1 
Teacher 0 2 13 0 0 
Board 5 9 12 2 1 
AFT 8 11 13 1 0 
Teacher 0 10 8 0 0 
Board 8 1 5 1 0 
The sample districts have been involved in a total of 10 strikes. 
The mean number of strikes in which a negotiator has been a participant 
is o.~2. The minimum number of strikes in which a negotiator has par-
ticipated has been 0.0. The maximum number of strikes in which a nego-
tiator has participated is 6. The negotiators from one NEA district 
have participated in one strike. The negotiators in two AFT districts 
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have participated in a combined total of nine strikes. One AFT district 
has experienced six strikes; the other AFT district has experienced 
three strikes. The total number of strikes which have occurred in NEA 
districts was one. The total number of strikes which have occurred in 
AFT districts was nine. The total number of NEA districts involved in 
strikes was one. The total number of AFT districts involved in strikes 
was two. Data pertinent to this discussion is presented in Table XXXII. 
TABLE XXXII 
NUMBER OF DISTRICTS EXPERIENCING STRIKES 
Total Number of Number of Strikes Total Number Districts Involved Per District of Strikes in Strikes 
6 
AFT Districts 2 3 9 
NEA Districts 1 1 1 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
a difference in the number of years of experience as a negotiator exist-
ed between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators. The computed U was 4. 
The U-prime was 26. The resulting Z score was 2.0 which has a proba-
bility of occurrence of .045. The difference in tenure as negotiators 
between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators was statistically signifi-
cant. Data germaine to this test are presented in Table XXXIII. 
TABLE XXXII I 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF TENURE AS NEGOTIATORS 
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
10~ 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Negotiators 26 
AFT Negotiators JJ 
The negotiators in the sample range in experience as a negotiator 
£ram a minimum 0£ one year 0£ experience to a maximum 0£ 25 years 0£ 
experience. The mean number 0£ years 0£ experience as negotiator £or 
all negotiators in the sample was J.6 years. The NEA negotiators ranged 
in years 0£ experience as negotiators £rom one to seven,. with a mean 
number 0£ years 0£ experience 0£ 2.6. The NEA teacher negotiators 
ranged in experience £ram one year to three years with a mean 0£ 1.7 
years 0£ experience as a negotiator. The NEA board negotiators ranged 
in experience as negotiators £ram a minimum 0£ one year to a maximum 0£ 
seven years. The mean number 0£ years 0£ experience as negotiators £or 
NEA board negotiators was J.J. The range in experience as negotiators 
£or AFT negotiators was £ram a minimum 0£ one year to a maximum 0£ 25 
years. The mean experience as negotiator was ~-9 years. The AFT 
teacher negotiators ranged in experience as negotiator £ram one to 12 
years with a mean 0£ J.6 years. The AFT board negotiators ranged in 
experience as negotiators £ram one to 25 years with a mean 0£ 6.5 years. 
The districts which recognize the AFT a££iliate as exclusive bargaining 
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agent had more experienced negotiators on their negotiating teams. Data 
pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XXXJV. 
TABLE XXXIV 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS NEGOTIATORS 
Mean Max. Min. Range 
All Negotiators 3.6 25 1 24 
All NEA Negotiators 2.6 7 1 6 
NEA - Teachers 1.7 3 1 2 
NEA - Board 3.3 7 1 6 
All AFT Negotiators 4.9 25 1 24 
AFT - Teachers 3.6 12 1 11 
AFT,.. Board 6.5 25 1 24 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
there was a difference in the number of memberships held in teacher 
organizations between NEA negqtiators and AFT negotiators. The computed 
U was 18. The U-prime was 12. The resulting Z score was 0.55 which has 
a probability of occurrence of .58. The difference in the number of 
memberships held in teacher organizations between NEA negotiators and 
AFT negotiators was not statistically significant. Data relevant to 
this test are presented in Table XXXV. 
TABLE XXXV 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS 
HELD BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS 
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Sample .N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Negotiators 18 12 0.55 
AFT Negotiators 33 
The negotiators in the sample held memberships in various teachers' 
organizations. The range was from 0.0 to seven organization member-
ships. The mean number of teacher organization memberships held by 
negotiators was 1.8. NEA negotiators ranged in memberships held from O 
to 6 with a mean membership held of 2.1. NEA teacher negotiators ranged 
in memberships held from one to six. The mean number of memberships in 
teacher organizations for NEA teacher negotiators was 3.1±. The range in 
memberships held for NEA board negotiators was from 0.0 to 5.0. The 
mean number of memberships held in teacher organizations by NEA board 
negotiators was 0.9. AFT negotiators ranged ~n number of memberships 
held in teachers organizations from a minimum of 0.0 to a maximum of 
seven. The mean number of memberships held by AFT negotiators was 1.5. 
The AFT teacher negotiators ranged in memberships held in teachers' 
organizations from 0.0 to seven. The mean number of memberships held 
was 2.0. The AFT board negotiators ranged in memberships held in teach-
er organizations from 0.0 to 1±.0. The mean number of memberships held 
was 0.8. There seemed to be little difference in memberships held in 
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teachers' organizations between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators. 
Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table :XXXVI. 
All 
All 
All 
TABLE XXXVI 
NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS HELD IN IEACHER 
ORGANIZATIONS BY NEGOTIATORS 
Mean Max. Min. 
Negotiators 1.8 7 0 
NEA Negotiators 2.1 6 0 
NEA - Teachers 3. 4: 6 1 
NEA - Board 0.9 5 0 
AFT Negotiators 1.5 7 0 
AFT,... Teachers 2.0 7 0 
AFT - Board o.8 4: 0 
Range 
7 
6 
5 
5 
7 
7 
4: 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
a difference in the number of years the sample districts had been nego-
tiating existed between NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated dis-
tricts. The computed U was 0.0. The U-prime was JO. The resulting Z 
score was -2.74: which has a probability of occurrence of .006. The dif-
ference in the tenure of negotiations between NEA affiliated districts 
and AFT affiliated districts was statistically significant. Data perti-
nent to this test are presented in Table XXXVII. 
TABLE XXXVII 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF TENURE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
BETWEEN NEA DISTRICTS AND AFT DISTRICTS 
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Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Districts 6 0 JO -2.74: .006 
AFT Districts 5 
The sample districts vary in the number of years in which they have 
been negotiating with the representatives of the teachers' organization. 
The range was from an NEA district which had been negotiating for three 
years to an AFT district which had been negotiating for 36 years. The 
mean for the sample was 11.0 years. The NEA affiliated districts ranged 
from three to seven years with a mean of 4:.5 years. The AFT districts ranged 
from 10 years to 36 years with a mean of 18.8 years. Data pertinent to 
this discussion are presented in Table XXXVIII. 
TABLE XXXVII I 
TENURE OF NEGOTIATIONS RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SAMPLE DISTRICTS 
Sample N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Total 11 11.0 3 36 
NEA Districts 6 3 7 
AFT Districts 5 18.8 10 36 
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A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if 
a difference in provisions for the scope of negotiations existed between 
NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was o.o. The U-prime 
was 30. The resulting Z score was -2.91 which has a probability of 
occurrence of .003. Data pertinent to this test are presented in 
Table XXXIX. 
TABLE XXXIX 
MANN-WHITNEY U 1EST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS 
Sample N u U-prime z Probability 
NEA Contracts 6 0 30 -2.91 .003 
AFT Contracts 5 
Five NEA contracts contained a provision which limited negotiations 
to specific areas. None of the AFT contracts contained a provision 
which limited negotiations to specific areas. 
Table XL presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, r, 
s 
which were computed when the six categories of contracts and the six 
areas of supplemental data were correlated with the negotiator scores on 
two attitudinal instruments, militancy and professionalism. Two sig-
nificant relationships were found. Negotiator militancy correlated sig-
nificantly and positively with the number of employee considerations in 
the contract and the number of years the district had been engaged in 
the negotiations relationship. 
TABLE XL 
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN TEACHER 
NEGOTIATOR ATTITUDE SCORES OF MILITANCY AND 
PROFESSIONALISM AND CONTRACT CATEGORY 
SCORES''.AND SUPPLE~NT:A'.RY PATA:.,. 
Attitude Scores 
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Contract Categories and 
Supplemental Data Militancy Professionalism 
Organizational Security .06 -.29 
Exchange of Facts & Views .oo .oo 
Professional Considerations .51 .25 
Employee Considerations .81 * ;36 
Impass Procedure -.38 .02 
Grievance Procedure 
--52 -.28 
Age 
--51 -.11 
Experience -.JO .09 
Degree -.49 -.JO 
Tenure as Negotiator .36 -.28 
Number of Memberships .21 .51 
Tenure of Negotiations .48 .07 
*Statistically Significant 
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Table XL! presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients which 
were computed when the six contract categories and six areas of supple-
mentary data were correlated with the negotiator scores on the Labor-
Management Attitude Questionnaire. Five significant relationships were 
found. Labor-management attitude correlated significantly and posi-
tively with the number of educational considerations in contracts, the 
number of employee considerations in contracts, and the number of years 
the district had been engaged in the negotiations relationship. Negoti-
ator labor-management attitude correlated significantly and negatively 
with grievance procedures in contracts and the degree held by the 
negotiator. 
TABLE XLI 
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN NEGOTIATOR 
SCORES ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND CONTRACT CA'IEGORY 
SCORES AND SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 
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Contract Categories and 
Supplementary Data 
Labor-Management Attitude 
Scores 
Organizational Security 
Exchange of Facts and Views 
Educational Considerations 
Employee Considerations 
Impass Procedures 
Grievance Procedures 
Age 
Experience 
Degree Held 
Years as Negotiator 
Number of Memberships 
Number of Years District Has 
Been Negotiating 
*Statistically Significant. 
..... 20 
.00 
.67* 
.75* 
- .51 
-.61 
-.58* 
-.13 
.64* 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMEND~TIONS 
This final chapter is divided into four parts. The first part is a 
summary of the study and findings. The second part contains conclusions 
drawn from the findings. Part three is a discussion of the study. Part 
four is a presentation of suggestions for further research. 
Summary of the Study and Findings 
The focus of this study was on negotiations as found in public edu-
cation. Specifically, the study was designed to determine the simil~ri-
ties and differences in attitudional orientation of negotiators and the 
similarities and differences in negotiated contracts between NEA and AFT 
affiliated districts. To measure the level of negotiator militancy, The 
Way .f. Seel.!_ was administered. To measure professionalism as exhibited 
by the negotiators, Views of the Teacher's Job was administered. The 
negotiators' level of identification with labor or management was meas-
ured with the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire. The agreements 
which were finalized by the negotiators in the study were perused, cate-
gorized, and analyzed. 
The sample school districts in this study were randomly selected 
from two lists. One list of twenty-one school districts affiliated with 
NEA. The second list contained the names of eleven AFT affiliated 
districts. The districts on both lists were geographically located in 
Region.five in the State of Illinois (Figure 1, page ~2). The districts 
were also engaged in face-to-face negotiations with the teachers' bar-
gaining unit. These negotiations concluded with a written agreement. 
The respondents were members of the teams which represent their 
respective party to negotiations. The two parties to the negotiations 
were the teachers' bargaining unit and the board of education. 
Of the twelve districts which were initially selected, six NEA and 
six AFT, eleven actually participated. Ninety-five negotiators were 
members of the various negotiating teams. Seventy-seven negotiators, 
eight per cent of the total, returned the completed instrument packet. 
Finalized contracts were received from each of the sample districts. 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of Significance was used to statistically 
test the nine hypotheses. Adhering to common practice, hypotheses were 
accepted if "P" 2:; .05. 
The following hypotheses w~re tested: 
H. 1. 
H. 2. 
There will be no significant difference in militancy 
between negotiators for the NEA and negotiators for 
the AFT. After analyzing and testing the data which 
are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis One was 
rejected. 
There will be no significant difference in profession-
alism as shown by the negotiators for the NEA as 
compared with professionalism as shown by the negotia-
tors for the AFT. After analyzing and testing the 
data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Two 
was accepted. 
H.J. 
H. 4 (a). 
H. 4(b). 
H. 4 ( c). 
H. 4(d). 
There will be no significant difference in labor-
management orientation as expressed by negotiators 
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for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by 
negotiators for the AFT. After analyzing and testing 
the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis 
Three was rejected. 
There will be no significant difference in provisions 
for organizational security between contracts negoti-
ated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negoti-
ated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing, and 
testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, 
Hypothesis Four (a) was accepted. 
There will be no significant difference in provisions 
for exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotia-
tions between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated 
districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated 
districts. After analyzing and testing the data which 
are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (b)·was 
accepted. 
There will be no significant difference in the number 
of educational considerations between contracts negoti-
ated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negoti-
ated in:AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and 
testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, 
Hypothesis Four (c) was rejected. 
There will be no significant difference in the number 
of employee considerations between contracts 
H. 4:(e). 
H. 4:(f). 
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negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts 
negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing 
and testing the data which are presented in Chapter 
IV, Hypothesis Four (d) was rejected. 
There will be no significant difference in provisions 
for impass resolution between contracts negotiated in 
NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in 
AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing 
the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis 
Four (e) was rejected. 
There will be no significant difference in grievance 
procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affili-
ated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affili-
ated districts. After testing and analyzing the data 
which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (f) 
was rejected. 
Conclusions 
Hypothesis One was rejected. The AFT negotiators expressed a sig-
nificantly higher degree of militancy than did the NEA negotiators. 
These findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis 
One. 
Hypothesis Two was accepted. The.difference in professionalism 
between the NEA negotiators and the AFT negotiators was not statisti-
cally significant. These findings tend to support the rationale for 
Hypothesis Two. 
Hypothesis Three was rejected. The AFT negotiators indicated a 
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significantly stronger identification with labor than,: did the NEA 
negotiators. All of the teacher negotiators indicated an identification 
with labor but the AFT teacher negotiators expressed a significantly 
higher identification with labor than did the NEA teacher negotiators. 
The AFT board negotiators tend to show a neutral identification while 
the NEA board negotiators tend to identify with management. The differ-
ence in the strength of identification with management was found to be 
significant. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for 
Hypothesis Three •. 
Hypothesis Four (a) was accepted. The differences in provisions 
for organizational security between NEA contracts and AFT contracts were 
not statistically significant. The provisions were similar in content 
and in number. These findings appear to support the rationale for 
Hypothesis Four (a). 
Hypothesis Four (b) was accepted. Provisions insuring the exchange 
of facts and views pertinent to negotiations were present in all con-
tracts; therefore, no significant difference was found. These findings 
appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (b). 
Hypothesis Four (c) was rejected. The AFT contracts contained a 
significantly higher number of educational considerations that did the 
NEA contracts. These findings do not appear to support the rationale 
for Hypothesis Four (c). 
Hypothesis Four (d) was rejected. The AFT contracts contained a 
significantly higher number of. employee considerations than did the NEA 
contracts. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for 
Hypothesis Four (d). 
Hypothesis Four (e) was rejected. The NEA contracts contained 
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provisions which deal with impass resolution. None of the AFT contracts 
contained such provisions. The findings did not appear·to support the 
rationale for Hypothesis Four (e). 
Hypothesis Four (f) was rejected. The NEA contracts contained 
grievance procedures which differed significantly from the grievance 
procedures in AFT contracts. The NEA contracts differed in the n,umber 
I' 
of steps; the number of contracts having arbitration as the final step; 
and the use of an outside agency for the selection of the arbitrators. 
The findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis 
Four (f). 
Data presented in Chapter III tend to indicate that there are no 
significant differences between the sample districts in wealth, per 
pupil expenditures, and average daily attendance. 
Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that NEA 
and AFT negotiators do not differ significantly in the following areas: 
age; tenure as educators; degree held; tenure as negotiators; number of 
organizational membership held. 
Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that NEA 
and AFT negotiators differ significantly in tenure as negotiators. The 
AFT negotiators appear to have a significantly higher number of years of 
experience in negotiations than do the NEA negotiators. 
Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that a 
significant difference in the tenure of the negotiations relationship 
exists between the NEA affiliated districts and the AFT affiliated dis-
tricts. The AFT districts tend to have been conducting negotiations for 
a significantly ld:qger period of time than have the NEA districts. 
Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV appears to indicate that 
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NEA and AFT contracts differ significantly in regard to provisions which 
outline the scope of negotiations. The NEA contracts tend to attempt to 
restrict the scope of negotiations to employee considerations. The AFT 
contracts do not contain provisions which attempt to restrict the scope 
of negotiations to employee considerations. 
A correlation matrix, Table XL in.Chapt~r IV 1 presents the 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between the teacher negotiator 
attitude scores of militancy and professionalism and the contract cate-
gory scores and supplementary data. The table presents twenty-four 
correlations, two of which are significant. Militancy correlates sig-
nificantly with the number of employee considerations in a contract and 
the number of years the district has been engaged in the negotiations 
relationship. Professionalism does not correlate significantly with any 
of the twelve factors. 
A correlation matrix, Table XLT iri Chapter IV, presents the 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between the scores of all negoti-
ators on the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire and the contract 
category scores and supplementary data. Labor-management attitude has a 
significant and positive relationship with the number of professional 
considerations in the contract and the number of employee considerations 
in the contract. Labor-management attitude has a significant and nega-
tive correlation with grievance procedures in contracts, the degrees 
held by the negotiator, and the number of years the district has been 
engaged in the negotiations relationship. 
Discussion 
It would appear, after testing and analyzing the data which was 
collected in the course of ~his study, that the findings do not agree 
with the rationale for six of the nine hypotheses, while they do in 
three of the nine. 
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There appeared to be a significant difference in militancy between 
the teacher negotiators for NEA and the teacher negotiators for AFT. 
Corwin (1963) states that taking a posture of challenge to established 
authority in decision making rather than showing compliance was in fact 
militancy. Analysis of the contracts tends to indicate that AFT teacher 
negotiators take the initiative in wanting to be included in the deci-
sion making process. The AFT teacher negotiators have negotiated more 
specific articles dealing with educational considerations and employee 
considerations than have their NEA counterparts. On the other hand, the 
NEA teacher negotiators have agreed to provisions which limit the scope 
of negotiations; therefore, limiting their inclusion in the decision 
making process~ 
It may be speculated that the specificity of the AFT contracts and 
the scope restrictions in the NEA contracts tend to retard discussion 
and lead to routinization. Rather than face the filing of grievances, 
the supervisor may tend to treat similar cases in a routine manner. 
This could have the tendency to impersonalize the environment in which 
the educator functions. Further implications appear to be the routinza-
tion of professional applications with which the educator is faced. The 
scope restrictions in the NEA contracts appear to attempt to eliminate 
areas of professional decisions from the negotiations process; therefore, 
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denying teachers imput into deliberations which effect the performance 
of the educator. 
The AFT affiliates have been engaged in the negotiations process 
for a longer period of time than have the NEA affiliates. The AFT 
negotiators have more negotiating experience than do the NEA negotia-
tors. The significant differences between NEA and AFT negotiators in 
these two areas may lead one to conclude that at least some of the dif-
ference in the number of employee and educational considerations in 
contracts can be attributed to tenure of the negotiations relationship 
and tenure of negotiating experience. 
Corwin (1963) in the development of the professionalism instrument, 
defined a professional as one who had published, had participated 
actively in a professional organization, and had remained in teaching at 
least five years. The number of negotiators who had published was so 
small, one, that it did not seem worthy of discussion. The AFT and NEA 
negotiators did not differ in the number of memberships held in organi~ 
zations. The AFT and NEA negotiators did not differ in experience in 
education. The AFT and NEA negotiators did not differ significantly in 
professionalism, as measured by Views of The Teachers Job. It appears 
that a professional educator would be equally at home as a negotiator 
for either the NEA or the AFT. 
It does not appear that the similarities in measures of profes-
sionalism were translated: into similar numbers of educational considera-
tions in contracts. The AFT contracts tended to contain a significantly 
higher number of educational considerations. When the professionalism 
scores on the instrument were related to the six contract categories and 
the six areas of supplementary data (see Table XLVIII), it was found 
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that no significant correlations were present. Analyzation of this data 
would lead one to speculate that the professional would tend to be in-
volved in the decision making process to a higher degree in the AFT 
affiliated districts than in the NEA affiliated districts. 
The AFT negotiators appeared to express a significantly higher 
identification with labor than did the NEA negotiators. This finding 
tends to be at odds with the rationale. It may be important to consider 
the fact that the NEA teacher negotiators do identify with labor. Their 
identification is not as strong as is the identification of the AFT 
teacher negotiators. The rationale in Chapter II speaks to the conver-
gence of NEA and AFT views on negotiation to a point somewhere between 
professionalism and unionism. It may be speculated that the NEA teacher 
negotiator is continuing that attitudinal shift toward labor. 
The AFT negotiators express a significantly stronger identification 
with labor than do the NEA negotiators. The AFT board negotiators ex-
press an identification with management. 
Horvat, Campbell, Watton, and McKersie, Chamberlain, and Carlson 
discuss the polarization of attitudes of negotiators and its effects 
upon negotiations. These authors also discuss the movement of the 
negotiations relationship from distributive bargaining to integrative 
bargaining. This movement or shift in relationships appears to occur 
over time. The AFT districts have been engaged in the negotiations 
relationship for a significantly longer period of time and the AFT 
negotiators have significantly hgiher tenure as negotiators. It may be 
speculated that a tendency exists. for the board negotiators to weaken 
their identification with management. It may also be speculated that 
this tendency for increased identification with labor on the part of the 
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board negotiators reduces the adherence to the idea of management pre-
rogatives, thus, increasing the scope of negotiations and adding to the 
specificity of contracts. 
Labor-management orientation correlates significantly with five of 
the twelve variables listed in Table XL.· It seem.s that a high 
identification with labor correlates with the number of educational and 
employee considerations in contracts. Labor-management correlates sig-
nificantly but negatively with the degree held by the negotiator. A 
high identification with labor correlates positively with the tenure of 
the negotiations relationship. It may be speculated that as the identi-
fication with labor increases and as tenure of the negotiations rela-
tionship lengthens, the negotiators tend to press for more involvement 
in the decision making process through the increased utilization of 
labor tatics for goal attainment. 
The findings from data relating to provisions for organizational 
security appear to support the rationale. NEA and AFT contracts do not 
differ significantly in provisions for organizational security. There 
seems to be little difference in effort to insure the survival of their 
organization as the exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers unit. 
The lack of procedures for the election of a rival organization as the 
exclusive representative for the teachers unit in some AFT contracts 
may be partially attributed to the AFT's alliance with the AFL-CIO and 
the umbrella of labor law and the National Labor Relations Board's 
decisions under which the parent organization functions. 
It may be speculated that the significant differences in impass 
procedures between NEA and AFT contracts tend to be a result, of a 
reliance upon labor law and labor tradition on the part of the AFT 
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affiliates. In a telephone conversation with the Executive Secretary of 
the Illinois Federation of Teachers, the researcher was advised that the 
philosophy of the AFT and its affiliated locals was that a formal impass 
procedure in a contract was restrictive and would tend to rule out 
alternative avenues for impass resolution. The Secretary further con-
tended that, if an impass situation was reached, the union affiliates 
utilized those impass procedures which are specified in labor law. 
These procedures, for all practical purposes, appear to be similar in 
nature and import to those which were found in the NEA contracts. The 
procedures provided for mediation, fact-finding, and advisory arbitra-
tion. Labor law also provides for bargaining in good faith. When taken 
in the light of actual practice rather than contract provisions, the 
difference in impass procedures utilized by NEA affiliates and impass 
procedures utilized by AFT affiliates seems to disappear. 
The grivance procedures in NEA contracts appear to differ signif-
icantly from the grievance procedures in AFT contracts. The NEA con-
tracts tended to contain one additional appeal step in the procedure. 
The NEA contracts rely more often upon arbitration as a final step than 
do AFT contracts. The NEA contracts rely upon outside arbitrators while 
the AFT contracts tend to conduct the final step with personnel from 
within the district. The use of outside arbitrators tends to be a 
stronger and more equitable practice in that an impartial third party 
advises both sides of the dispute of possible solutions for the griev-
ance. The NEA contracts appear to. be stronger and have a more equitable 
procedure for the adjudication of grivances. 
It would appear after analyzing the findings of this study that 
differences in the area of negotiations do exist between NEA affiliates 
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and AFT affiliates. The AFT contracts contain more employee considera-
tions and more educational considerations. This tends to indicate a 
more comprehensive contract. It could be speculated that a more re~ 
strictive atmosphere in which the educator must function is also indi-
cated. These findings could also indicate that some of the decisions 
which deal with the performance of professional responsibilities tend to 
be predetermined. The militancy and high identification with labor 
which were expressed by the AFT negotiators may tend to be translated 
into rigid proceudres which may retard change and innovation. The lower 
identification with labor and the lower level of militancy expressed by 
the NEA negotiators may tend to be contributing factors to the presence 
of provisions which restrict the scope of negotiations in NEA contracts. 
With the passage of additional state statues which enable boards of 
education to enter into negotiations relationships with teachers' organ-
izations, the choice of an organization to represent the teachers' bar-
gaining unit becomes more significant. It appears that the NEA 
affiliates and the AFT affiliates in this sample negotiate contracts 
which differ in some areas. The negotiators which represent the teach-
ers' unit also differ in some attitudinal orientations. It seems that 
teachers are not forced to choose between two identical organizations. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
One function of an empirical study is the suggestion of further 
research. Several possibilities for future studies were generated from 
the present investigation. 
(1) Walton and McKersie (1965) describe a phenomenon in 
negotiations which they call attitudinal structuring 
Through this process, the utility value of negotiators 
for items being negotiated are changed. Specifically, a 
study might be conducted which investigates the changes 
in utility value of negotiators during the negotiations 
process. 
(2) Because of the lack of generalizability of this study, a 
similar study with a larger and more representative 
sample should be undertaken. 
(J) Chamberlain (1951) speaks to the longitudinal change in 
the negotiations ~elationship between the employer and 
the employee organization. This change is from distribu-
tive or "hard-nosed" bargaining toward integrative or 
cooperative bargaining. Studies could be conducted to 
determine if such movement is present in negotiations in 
the public sector. 
(4) This study deals primarily with a quantitative evaluation 
of contracts. A qualitative analysis of contracts to 
determine if a difference in the types and content of 
provisions exist between NEA and AFT contracts is 
suggested. 
(5) Blau and Scott (1960) discuss group dynamics. They 
indicate that the group leaders tend to reflect the 
views of the group. Specifically, do the negotiators 
reflect the views of the bargaining unit and are these 
views negotiated into contracts? 
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A Methodological Consideration 
The profe.s:sionali:sm measure as developed by Corwin ( 1963) had not 
been validated on a population similar to the sample used in this study. 
No significant differences were found in scores between NEA and AFT 
negotiators. No significant differences were found in data gathered 
dealing with the criteria which was used to compute the initial valida-
tion of the instrument (e.g., having been a teacher for at least five 
years; having published; having been an officer or active in an associa-
tion; having been a member of two or more teachers' organizations). The 
scores on the professionalism measure did not correlate significantly 
with any of the twelve variables presented in Table XL in Chapter IV. 
Analysis of the preceding led the writer to question the discrimination 
capabilities of the instrument for the sample in the current study. 
In order to further examine the discrimination capabilities of the 
instrument, the current sample was divided into two groups. The cri-
teria for division were similar to the criteria used by Corwin (1963) 
when he divided his groups for validation of ~he instrument. Those 
teacher negotiators who met three of the following four criteria were 
placed in the high professional group: if he had published; had been in 
education for five or more years; held an office in a teacher's organi-
zation; or held memberships in more than two teachers' organizations. 
If the teacher negotiator had not met three of the four criteria, he 
was placed in the low professional group. Twenty-nine negotiators were 
placed in the high group and ten negotiators were placed in the low 
group. A 11 t 11 test for differences between means for groups with differ-
ent N's was computed. The resulting "t" value of 0.25 was not 
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statistically significant beyond the 0.05 level. It was concluded that 
the instrument did not discriminate between the high professional group 
and the low professional group in the current study. It is felt that 
data reported, analysis made, and conclusions drawn from the responses 
of negotiators to this instrument should be viewed with care. For this 
sample, for the purposes of this study, the professionalism instrument 
does not seem to be appropriate. Further usage of this instrument in 
inquires in the field of negotiations, when using similar populations, 
should be preceded by additional validation. 
Negotiations appear to be a primary vehicle by which teachers are 
being afforded imput to the decision making process in education. 
Legislation is being passed which enables representatives of teachers' 
organizations to bargain collectively with boards of education. The 
boundaries of the relationship which develops between employees and the 
employer are a function of the attitudes of the parties to negotiations. 
It is hoped that the foundations upon which the relationship between 
faculty and administration are laid will be based upon genuine efforts 
to improve education. The negotiations process, by defining the 
atmosphere in which professional educators must function, has a critical 
effect upon the teaching-learning relationship~ This teaching-learning 
relationship is the primary concern of all educators. It is hoped that 
the negotiators will function with the best interests of the students 
foremost in their minds. 
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.6. OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY - STILLWATER 
----~--0-K-LA_H_O_M_A_P_U_B-LI_C_· -SC-H-.-0-0_L_R_E_S-EA-. -RC_H_C_O_U_N_C_I_L ___ _ 
AFFILIATED, UNIVERSITIES 
The University of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State University 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C 
Phone 372-6211, ext. 62~5 
March 17, 1972 
Mr. R. Mas.on Holmes, Superintendent 
North Green C. U. #3 
318 'West Clay 
Roodhouse, Illinois 
Dear Mr. Holmes: 
I am currently a Research Assllciate with .the Oklahoma Public Research 
Council which is affiliated with Oklahoma State University. The subject of my 
study is "An Investigation of the Relationship Between the Attitudes of Militancy, 
Professionalism, and Labor-Management Orientation of Negotiators as Related to 
Selected Provisions of Negotiated Contracts." 
The subjects to be used are the negotiators for the teacher's group and the 
negotiators for the Board of Education. 
I wish to insure you that the names of the :i,,ldividual negotiators and the 
school district will be held in the strictest confidence. 
The total testing time will be approximately one hour, not including some 
demographic data which is needed. 
Through a process of random selection your school district has been selected 
to represent the Professional Association in the study. 
The testing can be accomplished in two manners: 1) I can come to your school 
district and administer the instruments, or 2) the instruments and the instruc-
tions can be mailed to you and an envelope addressed to me will be furnished so 
that the results can be returned_to te when completed.· 
Enclosed is a fonn which I hope;that you will fill out, place in the self-
addressed envelope, and mail. i 
Your cooperation in this study is vital. 
TT:hjb 
Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
Thomas Larry Thacker 
Research Associate 
139 
-----!---:-:-LL_:_HH_o_:-:-A_sT_;-;-:-L-~-:-lv_/_cR_~-:-;-L-R_E_:T-~A-L_~w_c_:_Tc_E_:_u_N_C_I_L ___ _ 
AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES 
The University of OklQhomo 
Oklahoma State University 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C 
Phone 372-6211, ext. 62-45 
April 7, 1972 
Mr. R. Mason Holmes, Superintendent 
North Green C. u. #) 
)18 West Clay 
Roodhouse, Illinois 
Dear Mr. Holmes: 
We are very distressed that you have decided not to participate in our pro-
posed study at this time. Your assistance in this study will, hopefully, add 
much needed info~tion about the negotiations process in the public educational 
setting. Writers dealing primarily with the negotiations process in the private 
sector have stated that the attitudes of the negotiators have an effect upon the 
contracts which they negotiate. The study at hand will try to add support to the 
contention, on the part of the writer, that the negotiators which represent the 
local affiliate of the National Education Associ~tion and the negotiators who 
represent the local affiliate bf the American Federation of Labor express sim.ilar 
attitudes, therefore, the contracts which are negotiated by these negotiators 
will not.be significantly different. 
The success of this study and therefore the addition of needed information 
about the negotiations process depends upon your cooperation. Your participa-
tion in the study is essential to the fulfillment of the proposed outcomes. We 
implore you to reconsider your participation in the study. As was stated in the 
preliminary letter, the names of the school and the individual participants will 
be held in the strictest confidence. 
Sincerely, 
Thomas Larry Thacker 
Research Associate 
140 
-----!---:-:-LL-AA_HH_o_:-:-A-ST_;-~---:-L-~-:..,..'v_/_cR-~-;-;-L_R_E_:T-~A-L-~w_c_:_Tc_E_:_u_N_C_I_L ___ _ 
AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES 
The UniVersity of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State Unlvonlty 
Mr. R. Mason Holmes, Superintendent 
North Green C. u. #3 
318 West Clay 
Roodhouse, Illinois 
Dear Mr. Holmes: 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 7-4074 
May 9, 1972 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hqll, Room 302 C 
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245 
We hope that this letter finds you relaxing at your desk with no problems and 
very little to do. I know this is not the case but I do hope that the closing 
of school will be non-traumatic. 
We want to thank you for the assistance you have rendered us by distributing the 
instrument packages to the individual negotiators. The returns thus far have been 
fair. With people being people and with the end,ri<>f the·school. year rapidly 
approaching, some gentle reminders are needed. We would appreciate your men-
tioning the instruments to the negotiators in case they have forgotten. 
If it were possible for you to send us the names and addresses of the negotiators, 
we could contact each by mail. There is no way that we can know which negotiators 
have returned instruments so we will need all of the names and addresses. · 
Your cooperation, especially at this busy time of the year, will be greatly 
appreciated. 
Enclosed is a self-addressed stamped envelope for yo1.1r convenience. 
TT:jt 
Enclosure 
Professionally, 
Thomas Larry Thacker 
Research Associate 
141 
A OKLAHO.MA STATE UNIVERSITY - STILLWATER 
-----~ ___ O_K_t;_A_H_O_M_A_P_U_B_L_I_C_S_C_H_O_O_L_R_E_S_EA-RC_H_C_O_U_N_C_I_L ___ _ 
AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES 
The University of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State University 
Dear Negotiator: 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C 
Phono 372-6211, ext. 6245 
You have recently received a pa~et of instruments from your superintendent. 
Along with the pa~et came a request to respond to the three instruments and place 
them in the mail. May is, of course, an extremely busy time of the year and there 
are many things on your mind. It would be extremely helpful to the OPSRC and to 
the research associate if you would take the time to dig up the instrument, respond 
to it, and mail it to me. 
If you have already responded to the instrumJ)nt and. have mailed it, please 
disregard this letter. Due to•the nature of the instrument, there is no way that 
I can or need to know who has responded, therefore, it is necessary to write to 
all of the negotiators who are a part of the study. 
We hope that your school year has been a successful one. 
TT:hjb 
Professionally, 
Thomas Larry Tha~er 
Research Associate 
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-----·---0-K_L_A_H_O_M_A_P_U_B_L_I_C_S_C_H_O_O_L_R_E_S_EA_,.R_C_H_. _C_O_U_N_C_I_L ___ _ 
AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES 
The University of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State Uni....ity 
Dear Negotiator: 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C 
Phone 372-6211, ext, 6245 
Sometime within the past month and one-half, packets of instruments were 
distributed to each of the negotiators who comprise both the teachers• team and 
the board's team. The researcher, in his infinite wisdom, could not have chosen 
a more inconvenient time to deliver these instruments. With the closing of 
school at hand, many of the individual negotiators concentrated their energies 
on their professional duties as educators and set the instruments aside. Now 
that the school year has ended, it is hoped that you will take the time to com-
plete the ~nclosed instrument packet and mail it in the self-addressed, prepaid 
envelope. 
If you have completed and mailed an instrument packet, please disregard 
this letter. There is no way that the re.searcher can know who has responded to 
the questionnaire, therefore, it is necessary to write all of the negotiators 
who are a part of the study. 
Again, it will be greatly appreciated if you will participate in the study. 
TT:jt 
Enclosures 
' Professionally, 
Thomas Larry Thacker 
Research Associate 
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AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES 
The University of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma Staie University 
Dear Negotiator, 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C 
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245 
We at the research council, wish to thank you for taking your time to answer 
these instruments. We hope that you feel that· the time you use is well spent. You 
will notice that the instruments are fastened with a paper clip. This is to keep 
them in the prescribed order. It will be helpful if you will answer'them in the 
order which they are placed. First, LABOR .. MANAGEMEN'l' ATTI',l'Uffi QUJl;STIONNAIRF:; Second, 
VIEWS OF 'l1IE '.IEACHE!l•S JOB; and Third, THE WAY I SEE IT. The answer sheets for each 
are either provided on the instrument, as in the case of the first two or provided 
in_additio!'l to the instrument as in the case of the third. Please mark your answers 
in the appropriate place. 
When you finish answering•the three instruments and the demographic sheet, 
please place them in the self addressed. envelope and place them in the mail. You 
can see that there is no opportunity for anyone but the researcher to see your 
answers! You can also see that yoU:r nam~ is not on the instrument, therefore, 
there is no way that anyone but yourself can know how you answered the questions. 
We wish to take the time to reiterate our thanks for your cooperation in 
the study. 
Sincerely, 
Thomas Larry Thacker 
Research Associate 
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Name of School District 
~ ...................................................................................................................................................................................... -
..................... 
YES we will participate in the proposed study dealing with 
Negotiations in Education • 
..................... Number of negotiators for the teacher's group. 
~ .............. Number of negotiators for the Board of Education. 
~ .............. We wish for you to mail the instruments and the instructions; we 
will administer the instruments, place them in the self-
addressed envelope, and mail them to the researcher. 
We wish for the researcher to come to our school district and 
..................... 
administer the instruments • 
..................... We do not wish to participate in the proposed study at this time. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUMENTATION PACKET 
I 
""' I.,-
1~6 
Name of School District 
(Circle One) Board Negotiator Teacher Negotiator (Circle One) 
Union Professional 
Sex Male Female 
Age 
------
Years in Teaching. _____ _ 
Degree _____ -
Number of Publications 
------
Number of Work Stoppages Participated in 
------
Were you in 
sympathy with the work stoppages? Yes ___ No __ _ 
Number of Teacher's Organizations to which you belong 
------
Number of offices Xou have held in the Various teacher's organizations 
of which you have been a member 
------
Number of years that you have been a negotiator 
------
LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Preliminary Remarks 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine the importance 
of some of the issues in the field of labor-management relations today, 
as well as to determine the position that various groups will take on 
those issues. 
In filling out the questionnaire, it is extremely important that 
you answer them according to your own ideas on the subject and not as 
someone else thinks about it or the way that you think it should be 
answered. 
Marking the Questionnaire 
On the following pages you will find various statements concerning 
one phase or another of an ,issue of present day labor-management 
relations. Before each statement are columns marked from 1 to 5. If 
you mark in column: 
-1-Strongly disagree - it means that this statement reads 
opposite to your attitudes on this issue or that you defi-
nitely disagree with the statement. 
-2-Disagree - it means that you partially disagree with the 
statement or that you believe it to be more wrong than 
right. 
-J-Undecided - it means that you are undecided about the state-
ment or that you stand in the middle-of-the-road on this 
issue. 
-~-Agree - it means that you partially agree with this state-
ment, that you agree with the statement with reservations 
or that this statement is more right than wrong. 
-5-Strongly agree - it means that you fully agree with the 
statement or that this statement expresses your attitude 
on the issue involved. 
Please mark a check in the column which best clearly represents 
your attitude about the statement. Be sure that you have placed one 
and only one check mark beside each statement. 
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1. Union demands of excessive wage 
increases are primarily responsible 
for large increases in prices. 
2. Layoffs should be made on the basis 
of seniority. 
3. The company should be given the right 
to discharge a man it considers 
unsatisfactory at any time during his 
employment. 
4. Individual initiative is more impor-
tant than collective security. 
5. Union leaders are more interested in 
their own financial welfare than in 
the workers' financial welfare. 
6. The union should be given equal rep-
resentation with management on the 
Board of Directors. 
7. White collar workers as well as 
laborers should be organized. 
8. Since management considers the worker 
as just another commodity to be used 
in production, workers must organize 
unions to defend their rights as 
individuals. 
9. Management must preserve the sole 
right to govern the company'·s pricing 
policy if industry is to survive. 
10. Unions should lobby for labor 
legislation. 
11. Unions struggle to keep existing work 
rules in order to ensure the health 
and safety of the worker, not to make 
unnecessary work or to featherbed. 
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12. Most of the violence found at picket 
lines is instigated by management 
itself. 
13. In all probability, management will 
someday break all unions since they 
do not fulfill any duty which cannot 
be fulfilled by management itself. 
14:. John L. Lewis has gained much for his 
men, but most of the gains have been 
at the expense of the public. 
15. In recent years, the high profits of 
management have been thrown away on 
advertising and the like when they 
should have been used to compensate 
workers for their increased produc-
tivity. 
16. A closed shop (all workers must join 
the union) is beneficial to the 
worker. 
17. The union does not represent the 
plant owners and should not attempt 
to participate in management's deci-
sions on plant policies. 
18. Corporation profits today are 
excessive. 
19. The unions no longer represent the 
interests of the workingman but that 
of top union executives. 
20. Management's assertion that inflation 
is a result of rising labor costs is 
a distortion of facts and degrades 
labor's contribution to industrial 
growth~ 
21. In a piece-rate system of payment, 
management should be allowed to set 
the piece-rate since they have hired 
experts in this fie.ld to do the work. 
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22. The AFL-CIO merger was another great 
step forward for American Industry. 
23. There is no reason why high union 
officials should not be paid as much 
as high management officials. 
24. Shortening the work week with no 
loss of pay is a sensible union solu-
tion to the problem of automation 
and unemployment. 
25. The union should help management in 
setting the pricing policy of the 
company. 
26. The higher standard of living that 
is enjoyed by the average American 
workingman today would have come 
about without the aid of unions. 
27. Some of the union's power should be 
taken away from it. 
28. Unions will eventually bring about 
the downfall of the Free Enterprise 
System. 
29. Management's practice of discrimina-
tion against older workers makes the 
union's fight for seniority rules a 
necessity. 
30. The problem in labor relations today 
is not that unions are too strong but 
management's refusal to accept labor 
as an equal partner in the industrial 
process. 
31. Unions should intensify their effort 
to organize government employees. 
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32. ·· The recent spiral in prices is due to 
price hikes on the part of management 
after which the unions demand pay 
hikes to keep up with the cost of 
living. 
33. The actions of top union officials 
are more for their own benefit than 
for the workers. 
34:. Unions should not meedle in politics. 
35. The union is not interested in power 
itself but only in protecting the 
welfare of its workers. 
36. Unions are more to blame for infla-
tion than are managements. 
37. Unions weaken individual initiative. 
38. Any policy changes in personnal pro-
cedures should be worked out in a 
joint conference between both man-
agement and union officials. 
39. White collar workers should not be 
unionized. 
4:0. The motives governing the action of 
top union officials are prestige and 
financial gain and not the welfare 
of the workers. 
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VIEWS OF THE TEACHER' S JOB 
1. It should be permissible for the teacher 
to violate a rule if he/she is sure that 
the best interests of the students will be 
served in doing so. 
2. Unless she is satisfied that it is best 
for the student, a teacher should not do 
anything which she is told to do. 
J. A good teacher should not do anything he 
belie,ves may jeopardize the interests of 
his students regardless of who tells him 
to or what the rule states. 
4. Teachers should try to live up to what 
they think are the standards of their pro-
fession even if the administration or the 
community does not seem to respect them. 
5. One primary criterion of a good s.chool 
should be the degree of respect that it 
commands from other teachers around the 
state. 
6. A teacher should try to put her standards 
and ideals of good teaching into practice 
even if the rules or procedures of the 
school prohibit it. 
7. Teachers should subscribe to and diligent-
ly read the standard professional journals. 
8. A teacher should be an active member of at 
least one professional teaching associa-
tion, and attend most conferences and 
meetings of the association. 
9. A teacher should consistently practice 
his/her ideas of the best educational 
practices even though the administration 
prefers other views. 
10. The major skill which a teacher should 
develop is his/her acquaintance with the 
subject matter. 
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VIEWS OF THE 1EACHER 1 S JOB, p. 2. 
11. Teachers should be evaluated primarily on 
the basis of their knowledge of the sub-
ject that they teach and on the basis of 
their ability to communicate it. 
12. Schools should hire no one to teach un-
less he holds at least a 4, year bachelors 
degree. 
13. In view of the teacher shortage, it 
should be permissible to hire teachers 
trained at non-accredited colleges. 
14,. A teacher should be able to make his own 
decisions about problems that come up in 
the classroom. 
15. Small matters should not have to be re-
ferred to someone higher up for a final 
answer. 
16. The ultimate authority over the major 
educational decisions should be exercised 
by professional teachers. 
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THE WAY I SEE IT 
ANSWER SHEET 
PLEASE PUT ALL ANSWERS TO THE INSTRUMENT ON THIS SHEET!!!!!!!! 
PART A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check 
only one) 
1. Comply with superior's request 
2. 
_3. 
4. 
_5. 
6. 
Try to compromise 
Seek the support of colleagues 
Ask for an investigation by a professional organization 
Refuse to comply with the request 
Quit the job 
PART B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply 
with the above request? (Check only one) 
1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal 
--2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal 
_3. Loss of reputation 
4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase 
5. Transferred to a less desirable position 
-6. Dismissal from the school system 
------------------------------------1. Part A. I 3 · Part A. I 5 · Part A. I 7 • Part A. 9. Part A. 11. Part A. 
1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 
-- -- --2 I 2 I 2 I 2 2 2 
3 I _3 I _3 I _3 _3 _3 
-4 I 4 I 4 I 4 4 4 
5 I 5 I _5 I 5 5 _5 
--6 
I -6 I 6 I -6 -6 6 
Part B. I Part B. I Part B. I Part B. Part B. Part B. 
1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 
I -- I -- I -- --2 2 2 2 2 2 
_3 I _3 I _3 I _3 _3 _3 
4 I 4 I 4 I 4 4 4 
5 I _5 I 5 I _5 _5 5 
-6 I 6 I -6 I 6 6 -6 
.... _ _ _ I_ _ _ _ _ I_ _ _ _ _ I ______ I ____________ 
2. Part A. I 4. Part A. I 6. Part A. Is. Part A. 10. Part A. I 12. Part A. 
1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I 1 
I -- I -- I -- -- I --2 2 2 2 2 2 
_3 I _3 I _3 I _3 _3 I _3 
4 I 4 I 4 I 4 4 I _4 
_5 I _5 I _5 I _5 _5 I 5 
6 I 6 I 6 I 6 6 I -6 
I I I I 
Part B. I Part B. I Part B. I Part B. Part B. I Part B. 
1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I 1 
-- -- -- -- --2 I 2 I 2 I 2 2 I 2 
_3 I _3 I _3 I _3 _3 I _3 
4 I 4 I 4 I 4 4 I 4 
5 I 5 I _5 I 5 _5 I 5 
-6 I -6 I 6 I -6 6 I -6 
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Below is a list of incidents which have occurred in different 
schools throughout the country. We are interested in getting your 
reactions to these situations. There is no right or wrong answer. 
Just imagine yourself as the teacher in each situation. Indicate (1) 
what you would do in each of these situations, and (2) what is likely 
to happen to you if you do not comply when a situation arises at your 
school. 
1. The assistant principal told a teacher that he was too "out-
spoken" in criticizing certain policies of the school and that this 
was causing unrest among faculty members, suggesting that he refrain 
from further outspoken criticism ••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE 
TEACHER ••••• 
2. A mathematics teacher was told by the principal that he was not 
presenting his subject in the most effective way, and that he should 
revise his couse content and the methods of teaching it. He main-
tained that his professional society had recommended these procedures 
••••••••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER ••••••••••••••••• 
J. A teacher planned to invite a well-known author to speak for his 
class but the principal advised against it because of the speaker's 
alleged "socialistic leanings". The teacher felt the allegations 
were unfounded, and that his students would benefit by hearing what 
he had to say •••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE .'IEACHER ••••••••••• 
~- The school board rules explicitly stated that teachers should not 
participate in the local school board elections. One teacher made a 
public statement that one of the present board members was a pro-
fessional politician, and otherwise actively engaged in the campaign • 
•••••••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE 'IEACHER ••••••••••••• 
5. A.' principal ·occasion~lly changed the grade givep. by: .. one of his 
teachers, if a student's complaint to him seemed to justify a higher 
grade. One teacher protested; she was told by the principal that he 
had the final responsibility for whatever happened in the school, he 
asked her to understand ••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER ••••••• 
6. )The administration requested teachers not to use a standard>text-
book in American Government because it was "socialistically inclined". 
A history teacher felt that the book was the best available and pro-
ceeded to submit an order for it ••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE 
'IEACHER ••••••••••••••• 
7. The administration changed a course of study which had included 
philosophy and music appreciation to one which was based almost com-
pletely on the sciences and mathematics. A committee of teachers 
went to see the principal and voiced disapproval. They were told 
that the administration was in a better posi.t'ion to make the decision. 
• • • • • • • • • • IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER •••••••••• 
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8. .A chemistry teacher took an active public stand in favor of 
water flouridation in a community that was divided on the issue. The 
superintendent requested him to avoid becoming further involved in 
the issue •••••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER •••••••• 
9. The superintendent insisted that all teachers live in the dis-
trict in which they presently teach. One teacher continued to live 
in another section of the city •••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER. 
10. The administration issued a directive that teachers should help 
to improve parent-teacher relations. 
established to help select textbooks. 
A parent-teacher committee was 
One math teacher refused to 
participate, stating that members of such a committee are not qual-
ified to select textbooks ••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER ••••• 
11. One school system did not permit students to read several 
American literature classics by Faulkner, Hemmingway, Steinbeck and 
others. One English teacher actively sought to have the policy 
repealed by soliciting the support of certain influential citizens 
in the community. The principal asked her to desist in her campaign 
against the policy because she was stirring up trouble for the 
school. She said that her action had the support of the National 
English Teachers' Association •••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER. 
12. In one school, male teachers received preference in promotions. 
A group of women teachers at the school complained to the school 
board. They were told that the situation would be changed, but it 
was not. One woman who was passed over for a promotion wrote a 
letter to the NEA and State Department of Education. The principal 
ordered her to stop stirring up trouble •••••••• IMAGINE YOURSELF 
AS THE TEACHER ••••.••••• 
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